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Abstract 
 Punishments that are issued by the criminal justice system can enhance 
factors related to recidivism or contribute to offender rehabilitation. Investigating 
the ecological element of public attitudes toward punishment can inform efforts of 
second-order change for reducing recidivism and improving offender and 
community wellbeing (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Kelly, 1966; Watzlawick, 
Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). 
The form and duration of punishments can be influenced by the goals that 
punishments are meant to achieve. Punishment goals include retribution, 
incapacitation, individual deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
restorative justice. Each of the goals can lead to sanctions that impact offender 
behavior differently yet substantive predictors of when the different goals are 
pursued have yet to be discovered. 
An important stakeholder in the operations of the criminal justice system 
is the general public, and public opinions regarding sentencing practices can 
impact the punishments that are issued (Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, & Hough, 
2003). This paper will whether the moral characteristics of crimes along with 
social functional accounts of emotion can predict public support for the goals of 
punishment. 
 Social functionalist accounts of emotion suggest that different emotions 
are elicited by appraisals that are made of events in the environment. Emotions 
then lead to different action tendencies for responding to the appraisals. The 
action tendencies are goal oriented and may take the form of punishment goals. 
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The appraisal of a crime by the public can include an assessment of its 
moral qualities. Moral Foundations Theory suggests there are five categories of 
moral concern: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity (Haidt & Graham, 
2007). This paper examined whether public appraisals of the five types of moral 
violation predict three appraisals of the offender: whether the offender committed 
an immoral act, whether the offender was morally incompetent, and whether the 
offender possessed an immoral nature. These secondary appraisals were then used 
to predict five emotions that people may experience when being informed of a 
crime: anger, fear, contempt, sympathy, and disgust. Finally, the emotions, each 
with their own goal-oriented action tendency, were used to predict the goals of 
punishment desired by the public. 
Predicted relations between the appraisals, emotions, and punishment 
goals were combined to form a path model. To test the model, 546 participants 
completed an online survey and a path analysis of the model was conducted. A 
majority of the predicted relations were significant; however, the model did not fit 
the data. Additional analyses were then performed to develop a model that did fit 
the data. 
Violations of authority and purity moral principles indirectly predicted 
support for all the punishment goals. Furthermore, while the appraisal of an 
immoral act lead to anger and support for retribution, the appraisal of an immoral 
nature lead to many emotions and support for a variety of punishment goals. 
Finally, fear did not predict support for any punishment goal, and sympathy for 
the offender predicted support for rehabilitation and restorative justice. 
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The findings have implications for theory, interventions, and policy. The 
study shows that public attitudes toward criminal punishment can be predicted by 
moral concerns and emotions. Interventions could be developed to reduce the 
appraisal of an immoral nature, which was a strong predictor for the punitive 
punishment goals. Finally, the study presents ideas for how policies can be 
changed to reduce the size of the prison population. 
Punishments are necessary for responding to crime, but different 
punishments produced by different goals can differentially impact recidivism 
rates. Determining how perceptions of crime can lead to public support for 
various punishment goals can help inform systems change efforts at improving 
sentencing practices. 
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From Crime to Punishment: Moral Violations and the Social Function of Emotion 
 Social behavior and social systems are based heavily on shared norms that 
determine appropriate and inappropriate ways to conduct oneself and interact with 
others. Social systems sustain shared collections of norms by having methods for 
shaping and correcting individual behavior. For every norm, in fact, there is a 
corresponding understanding of what may happen if the norm is violated (Clark & 
Gibbs, 1965). Well functioning social systems with norm enforcement allow 
individuals a degree of predictability and safety and provide efficiency in social 
interactions. Violations of social norms may harm individual victims but also 
undermine normative values and breach the overarching, communal social order 
(Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004; Vidmar, 2000). Even people not 
directly involved in a norm violation can experience a desire for the violator to 
receive some form of reprimand (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Vidmar & Miller, 
1980). Penalties for norm violations can be issued rapidly by fellow members of 
the social system and can range in severity from mild criticism to ostracism. Such 
sanctions serve a variety of purposes that include influencing the violator’s 
behavior, redressing a wrong, and reaffirming the social order. For some of the 
more serious norm violations, a criminal justice system is used by a social system 
to determine culpability and to issue sanctions to the group’s offenders. 
 A criminal justice system enforces laws for the protection of individuals 
and society. The American criminal justice system consists of three branches: law 
enforcement, the courts, and the correctional system. After a law is broken, the 
courts issue a sanction to the offender which is then carried out by the correctional 
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system. Annual expenditures to operate the country’s criminal justice systems (at 
local, state, and federal levels) reached 195.3 billion dollars in 2003 with the 
correctional branch costing 63.4 billion dollars (Hughes, 2006). At year end in 
2010, 7.1 million people in the U.S., or 2.3% of its population, were completing 
sanctions within the adult correctional systems (Glaze, 2011). 
One purpose of punishing offenders is to reduce criminal behavior, but the 
outcomes of the criminal justice system may not always be in line with this 
objective. Following release from prison, 68% of offenders are rearrested and 
47% are reconvicted of a crime (Hughes & Wilson, 2002). Lengthy terms of 
imprisonment can reduce an offender’s job opportunities, instill a criminal 
identity, and increase criminal associations (Baillargeon, Hoge, & Penn, 2012; 
Pager, 2003; Thomas, Peterson, & Cage, 1981) all of which have been associated 
with increased recidivism (Astone, 1982; Chu, Daffern, Thomas, & Lim, 2012; 
Fischer, Shinn, Shrout, & Tsemberis, 2008; Fite et al., 2012; Martin, Cloninger, & 
Guze, 1978; Nikulina, Widom, & Czaja, 2011; Vaux & Ruggiero, 1983). On the 
other hand, evidence-based, rehabilitation programs are available to the criminal 
justice system that have been associated with reduced recidivism (Coulter & 
VandeWeerd, 2009; Jason et al., 2008; Liau et al., 2004; Seave, 2011; Van Stelle, 
Mauser, & Moberg, 1994). 
Reducing recidivism can strengthen communities and improve the 
wellbeing of released offenders. However, the criminal justice system has varying 
influences on recidivism. Community psychology theory can contribute to 
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understanding the operations of the criminal justice system and improve its 
effectiveness in reducing crime. 
Community Psychology Theories and Values 
Promoting individual wellbeing and preventing social, emotional, and 
behavioral problems are goals embedded in community psychology values 
(Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman, 2007; Jason & Glenwick, 2002). An individual’s 
wellbeing is at risk when convicted of a crime as public resources are funneled 
through the criminal justice system toward the punishment of the individual, 
usually by depriving the individual’s fundamental right to freedom (De Keijser, 
van der Leeden, & Jackson, 2002). 
Understanding the operations of the criminal justice system and its 
treatment of offenders can be improved by understanding its ecology. Ecological 
perspectives of social and justice issues consider how individuals, groups, and 
settings form dynamic and interrelated systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Kelly, 
1966; Trickett, 1984). While the criminal justice system can impact the wellbeing 
of an offender, and influence either offender reform or recidivism, the justice 
system itself is influenced by attitudes held within the general public. Public 
opinions regarding punishment are important for establishing criminal justice 
policies. While it is argued that penal law and practices should not be dictated by 
public attitudes (Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug, & Gabriel, 2002), punishment statutes 
and the practices of judicial and correctional systems do need to consider public 
opinion. Large discrepancies between public attitudes and governmental practices 
can reduce public trust and increase contempt toward criminal justice authorities 
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and institutions (Nadler, 2005; Robinson & Darley, 1995; Tyler, 1990). As such, 
many penal policies in the United States and other countries are indeed influenced 
by public opinion and even by government officials’ misperceptions of public 
opinion (Roberts et al., 2003; Tonry, 2001). For example, state political 
orientation, based on public polls, predicts length of sentence for crimes against 
persons (i.e., rape, assault, and robbery) with conservatism being positively 
related to longer sentences (Bowers & Waltman, 1993). 
One public response to offenders is an opposition to offender reintegration 
into the community. For example, efforts to establish group homes for people 
with past deviancies have experienced substantial neighborhood opposition and 
municipality interference (Jason et al., 2008). Yet developing social capital and a 
sense of community have been shown to reduce violent acts and other forms of 
antisocial behavior (Schofield et al., 2012; Zeldin, 2004). For example, 
experiencing neighborhood and family support have been related to lower levels 
of individual delinquency (Vieno, Nation, Perkins, Pastore, & Santinello, 2010). 
Public appraisals of offenders that include perceiving offenders as dangerous or as 
otherwise objectionable figures may increase a public desire for longer periods of 
incarceration that can sever important social ties. 
Investigating the public’s views of crime and punishment can help in 
understanding the criminal justice system’s ecology and would therefore be a step 
toward effectively implementing second-order change. Second-order, or systems, 
change addresses the systems and structures surrounding a social issue and is 
distinguished from first-order change which focuses on the individuals most 
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directly associated with the issue (Foster-Fishman, Nowell, & Yang, 2007; 
Watzlawick et al., 1974). First-order change is a frequent approach taken towards 
crime. When thinking about crime, people generally focus on how criminals 
should be dealt with or on the individual psychology of criminal behavior. This 
can be seen in research demonstrating how people consider a disciplinary 
punishment for an offender when asked to provide a response to a crime, and only 
consider the victim, surrounding community, or rehabilitation when instructed to 
do so (Gromet & Darley, 2009). 
The theories of community psychology suggest that understanding 
ecological systems and implementing second-order change are advantageous to 
achieving its values of promoting individual and community wellbeing. As public 
attitudes can influence criminal justice practices, which in turn can increase either 
offender recidivism or rehabilitation, understanding how the general public’s 
opinions regarding criminal punishment are formed can help develop effective 
methods to improve the justice system and reduce criminal activity. This paper 
will therefore investigate the psychological underpinnings of the public voice 
regarding crime and punishment, and by doing so, contribute to the knowledge 
capital of community psychology. 
Understanding Crime and Punishment: Morality and the Social Function of 
Emotion 
Previous studies have investigated how certain characteristics of crimes 
can affect public attitudes toward punishment goals. For example, Carlsmith 
(2006) found the magnitude of the harm caused by a crime is related to a desire 
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for retribution, and the frequency of a crime is related to deterrence. Studies have 
also shown the perception of a crime’s seriousness is positively related to the 
severity of the assigned punishment (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Warr, 
Meier, & Erickson, 1983), and that a crime’s seriousness is predicted by its 
perceived wrongfulness (Rosenmerkel, 2001; Warr, 1989). The wrongful nature 
of a behavior is important for deciding if a behavior is a criminal behavior, and 
for determining an appropriate punishment, but the concept of wrongfulness 
requires further exploration. 
 Morality encompasses considerations of what is right and wrong. When 
principles and codes of conduct include a moral connotation, they are understood 
to apply universally to all people and to weigh in on diverse situations (Kant, 
1785/1959; Turiel, 1983). Morality allows for individual human dignity and self-
esteem to be enhanced (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) and for groups 
to survive and prosper as single units (Haidt, 2012). Evolved social norms, 
traditions, and institutions combine with innate psychological mechanisms to 
form moral systems that function to moderate individual selfish interests and to 
allow for people to live within communal settings (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Kesebir, 
2010). Immoral acts need to be prevented and possibly punished while moral acts 
are encouraged through social and psychological rewards. A society’s moral order 
is embedded within its more general social order and sustained in part by the 
functional role of emotions (Haidt, 2003; Shweder et al., 1997). 
Functionalist accounts of emotion propose that cognitive appraisals of 
events and objects lead to the onset of distinct emotions which carry with them 
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different states of behavioral readiness for responding to the event. Lazarus (1966, 
1991) and Weiner (1985, 1986) have proposed two stages of cognitive appraisal. 
During the primary stage, an event is determined to be relevant to personally 
desired goals and is appraised as being favorable or unfavorable with respect to 
those goals. Perceiving the violation of a personally endorsed moral principle, for 
example, is a primary appraisal. During the secondary appraisal process, causal 
factors for the event are considered along with considerations about the future. 
The secondary appraisal stage produces specific emotions, each having a 
particular action tendency oriented toward achieving a particular goal. 
Morality underlies the wrongfulness of crimes. Perceiving a crime, and the 
moral violations within it, often leads to appraisals of the offender and 
considerations of the offender’s future behavior. Different appraisal outcomes 
produce different emotions and with them come different goals. It is speculated 
that the goals of punishment desired of the criminal justice system when a crime 
occurs are based on the action tendencies experienced in the public when moral 
violations are perceived and emotions are experienced. 
Recent developments in moral psychology have identified five categories 
of moral principles, which can be violated to different degrees by different crimes. 
This paper will investigate how primary appraisals of which moral principles are 
violated during a crime predict secondary appraisals about the offender. The 
secondary appraisal variables will be the degree to which the offender committed 
an immoral act, the moral incompetence of the offender, and the immoral nature 
of the offender. The secondary appraisals will then be used to predict anger, 
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contempt, disgust, sympathy, and fear. Finally, the emotional states will be used 
to predict which goals of punishment are desired. 
Defining Morality 
 The concept of morality stretches from daily life events to cultural and 
religious icons. While most of morality’s psychological and social processes 
progress unnoticed, when a particular moral characteristic is explicit in a person’s 
behavior patterns or nature, we say they have a virtue or are virtuous. If a person’s 
moral behavior is extensive enough or that person is otherwise endowed with 
having a notable moral nature, they may be considered a saint. Vices, on the other 
hand, refer to consistent and mild immoral behavior patterns. More extensive 
immoralities with possible connections to an agent’s nature can bring the label 
“sinner” and onward toward “demon” and “devil” (Brandt & Reyna, 2011). 
 Values, like morals, can influence attitudes and motivations and guide 
behavior and decision-making (for a review, see Rohan, 2000). Values can be 
differentiated from morals, however, in how they apply to judgments of behavior. 
The importance of values and their implications for judgments of goals and 
behavior are not always universal but rather are acknowledged to be relevant to 
the individual or individual social group who holds them (Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1994). Schwartz (1992), for example, delineated 10 primary values 
found to exist in a variety of cultures. The function of values, similar to morals, is 
to orient individuals and groups toward desirable objectives. Differences in the 
priority of values across parties, however, do not generate the same judgments of 
right and wrong as in the case of differences in moral behavior. Schwartz’s value 
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of self-direction, for example, characterized by independence and individualism, 
has relatively high importance in Western cultures, while the value of conformity, 
which includes obedience and self-restraint, is given more emphasis by Eastern 
cultures. While these values and their corresponding value systems shape goals 
and guide behavior within the respective cultures, the individualism or 
collectivism of the other culture is not necessarily seen as immoral and in need of 
correction for the moral welfare of its people. Even within cultures there exist 
individual differences in value priorities yet these differences are not always 
attached to judgments of right or wrong. The value of stimulation, for example, 
varies in importance across individuals, but whether a person prefers a stable, 
daily routine with little excitement and novelty is not considered a moral issue 
with moral implications. 
 Values, or “conceptions of the desirable” (Kluckhohn, 1951; Schwartz, 
1999), can acquire a moral quality, however, when their relativity becomes more 
disturbing, and the value-based misbehaviors of others generate views of right and 
wrong. Values can be considered moral values when their guidelines for conduct 
and decision-making are to be endorsed by people in general and are no longer 
seen as local conventions or to be left to individual preferences. Schwartz’s value 
of benevolence, for example, which includes helpfulness, honesty, and loyalty, 
functions for many as a moral value by guiding their own conduct as well as their 
moral evaluations of others. 
 Much of the decision-making, goal selection, and attitude formation that 
goes on in the moral domain is performed with little or no conscious awareness 
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(Lapsley & Hill, 2008), and while people can easily experience clear moral 
opinions about whether something is right or wrong, they often have difficulty 
explaining the genesis of their opinions and are left with a consciously articulated, 
but intuitively derived, it’s wrong “because it’s wrong” conclusion (Haidt, 2001; 
Haidt, Koller, Dias, 1993). On other occasions, moral concerns become part of a 
person’s self-concept, producing for him or her a conscious moral identity (for a 
review, see Hardy & Carlo, 2005). The sense of self as a moral agent paired with 
particular moral principles and goals can influence conscious deliberation and 
even drive the pursuit of long-term moral objectives. 
Development of Moral Psychology 
Past centuries of Western philosophy have influenced psychological 
conceptions of the content and process of morality. During the 18th century, the 
Age of Enlightenment brought a cultural movement of advancing knowledge 
through scientific inquiry and improving society through reason. The paradigm 
was then incorporated into a process of moral decision-making advocated by 
Immanuel Kant, who argued that moral judgments and actions should be 
determined by reason alone and that moral responsibilities only apply to rational 
agents (Kant, 1785/1959). What the end goals of moral systems should be, or 
effectively what constitutes the moral domain, was shaped by philosophers such 
as John Stuart Mill (1859/2003) who argued that societies and states should 
pursue a form of utilitarianism that maximizes liberty and wellbeing for all 
individuals. The rationalist views of Kant and the utilitarian arguments of Mill 
both describe how societies and individuals ought to function and became a part 
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of Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1969) influential psychological theory of how moral 
judgment develops. 
Kohlberg proposed a stage model describing how children develop 
morally as their reasoning develops. The model included a hierarchy of moral 
rules. Children would move up the ladder as they resolved moral dilemmas by 
considering reciprocity, loyalty, then legal rules and laws, and would reach the 
most advanced stage once their reasoning was based on considerations of human 
rights and welfare. The model received support in studies on Western populations 
with liberals reaching higher stages than conservatives, though conservatives 
would match the performance of liberals when instructed to respond in a liberal 
manner (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983). 
 A different model of the moral domain, one removing the hierarchy of 
moral considerations by positioning multiple moral concerns alongside 
considerations of justice and human rights, was developed by Shweder and 
colleagues (Shweder et al., 1997). The research team conducted an exploratory 
study with residents of Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India, who were mostly Brahmans. 
Thirty-nine scenarios depicting potential violations of codes of conduct were 
developed based on ethnographic knowledge of local family and community 
customs. Participants were interviewed for explanations as to why the depicted 
behavior was wrong. An inductive iterative classification of the interview content 
produced 16 thematic categories of rationales used in establishing moral 
judgments of the scenarios. Cluster analysis and stepwise discriminant analysis 
were then used to identify three overarching clusters of moral considerations 
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called the “big three” of moral ethics. The first, the ethic of autonomy, includes 
considerations of harm, rights, and justice. An individual is seen as an agent with 
personal preferences and entitled to personal safety, freedom, and wellbeing. 
Through the ethic of community, a person is considered a part of an 
interdependent collective. The identity, standing, and integrity of the group guide 
the ethics of community, and judgments of moral acts and violations are based on 
considerations of duty, loyalty, interdependency, and roles within social 
hierarchies. The third ethic, the ethic of divinity, conceptualizes a person as a 
spiritual entity with an elevated status within a sacred order. Degradation and 
defilement of the spiritual aspects of a person through sin or pollution are 
prevented by the ethics of divinity. 
 A single event could violate any one or all three of the sets of ethics. For 
the Hindu sample in the study described by Shweder for example, a father 
opening and reading the mail of his son was a particularly high violation of the 
ethics of community, while a boy sleeping in the same bed as his mother until he 
was 12 years old was evaluated as an equal violation of all three sets of ethics. 
Within the Hindu notion of morality, each of the three sets of ethics is 
necessary for enhancing human dignity and self-esteem (Shweder et al., 1997). 
Without any one, human wellbeing would suffer. At the same time, however, it is 
not always possible that the benefits offered by the three sets can be maximized 
simultaneously within a society. The ethical categories themselves may even 
conflict with each other leaving individuals to struggle over moral dilemmas. 
Furthermore, not all individuals will experience the same dilemmas as the moral 
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importance of each of the three categories varies from person to person. In the 
West, for example, people who endorse liberal views generally rate the ethic of 
autonomy as more important than people who endorse conservative views, which 
led to liberals performing better on Kohlberg’s autonomy-centered model of 
moral development (Graham et al., 2011). Conservatives, on the other hand, 
consider the ethic of divinity as a more important moral principle than liberals do 
(Graham et al., 2011). Cultures also play a role as they can promote the ethics to 
different degrees, potentially neglecting one or exaggerating another as they each 
construct their own “social order as a moral order” in different ways (Shweder et 
al., 1997, p. 141). 
For Western and particularly liberal cultures, behaviors that are harmful to 
another person are given particular attention as moral violations. To test the 
existence of Shweder’s three ethics, and specifically to determine whether actions 
could be harmless yet still considered morally wrong, Haidt, Koller, and Dias 
(1993) asked adults in the U.S. and Brazil for their views on five seemingly 
harmless yet potentially offensive actions. The “harmless-offensive” actions 
included events such as a family eating their dog after it was killed in a car 
accident and a woman cutting up a flag and using the pieces to clean the 
bathroom. After hearing the scenarios, participants were asked questions that tap 
into human morality: is the action wrong; did the action hurt anyone; and why is 
the action wrong or OK. Participants were interviewed in three cities (two in 
Brazil and one in the U.S.) and were divided into high and low socio-economic 
status (SES) groups, creating six samples. The percentage of participants in the 
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samples who thought the actions were wrong ranged from 40% to 91% while the 
percentage of participants who thought the actions hurt someone ranged from 
28% to 51%.  
Reasons provided by the participants for why the actions were wrong were 
coded using Shweder’s three categories of moral ethics (Shweder et al., 1997). 
Reasons relating to harm, rights, justice, or freedom were assigned to the 
autonomy category. Reasons referring to respect, loyalty, duty, or authority were 
coded as community reasons. Explanations with reference to disgustingness, 
beastliness, dignity, or sin were counted as divinity violations. The majority of 
responses fit one of the categories. Reasons relating to autonomy were used 31% 
of the time, reasons relating to community 24% of the time, and judgments based 
on divinity concepts were given 12% of the time. The remaining responses, 33%, 
were either circular by stating the action was wrong “because a person should not 
[do the action]” or did not clearly fit one of the categories provided in Shweder’s 
model. High-SES groups were more likely to judge the acts based on reasons 
related to autonomy and less likely to use community or divinity based 
explanations. Also, participants in the U.S. were also more likely to make 
autonomy based judgments, but no differences in community or divinity 
explanations were found between cities. 
The studies described above found the autonomy, community, and divinity 
categories of ethics to be applied by people across SES levels and in different 
cities and countries. At the same time, the category of ethics used to judge an 
action varied in frequency across SES levels and city showing that the relative 
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importance of the three categories can vary across groups. The intergroup 
variance in importance of moral ethics suggests that social and cultural factors can 
influence the moral judgments of individuals. Considering that individual 
judgment is malleable, altering the messages of media and other directors of 
culture can alter the psychological moral judgments of the public. Affecting moral 
judgment may be one means of affecting the punishment goals desired by the 
public, and therefore one avenue for implementing second-order change and 
achieving the community psychology goals of reducing recidivism and improving 
offender and community wellbeing (Dalton et al., 2007; Watzlawick et al., 1974). 
To further understand the psychology of morality, the model proposed by 
Kohlberg (1969) needs to be modified by expanding the moral domain beyond 
conceptions of harm and fairness. The studies described above showed that people 
made moral judgments based not only on individual rights and wellbeing but also 
on preserving the structures and functions of human groups and on protecting the 
dignity and stature of the sacred and the divine. As moral violations require 
responses from the surrounding community in order to protect the moral order, 
and various goals of punishment guide the sentencing decisions of the justice 
system, perhaps a more detailed model of morality is needed to understand the 
varied goals of punishment. While Schweder’s three ethics of autonomy, 
community, and divinity expanded the moral domain, a more extensive taxonomy 
of moral concerns has since been developed and is provided by Moral 
Foundations Theory. 
Expanding the Moral Domain: Moral Foundations Theory 
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 The moral domain consists of all the constructs that bring forth moral 
considerations and judgments, all the views of right and wrong that go beyond 
individual preferences for one’s own life or community and are applied 
universally. To explore the moral domain, Shweder and colleagues used cluster 
analysis of moral arguments provided during discourse and determined the moral 
domain consisted of three categories of moral concern: autonomy, community, 
and divinity. Considering that morality might have an evolutionary basis, Haidt 
and Joseph (2004) surveyed several comprehensive works on morality and values 
that looked at various cultures and other primates, and analyzed the selected 
works for common themes. Shweder’s (Shweder et al., 1997) descriptions were 
considered along with Fiske (1991), Schwartz and Bilsky (1990), Brown (1991), 
and de Waal’s (1996) description of the social lives of chimpanzees. 
The review produced five categories that the researchers called moral 
foundations. The names of the five foundations were modified by Haidt and 
Graham (2007) to become harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Though Haidt and Joseph (2004) did not 
intend to confirm Shweder’s three ethics in particular, the five moral foundations 
are closely aligned with these three categories. The harm and fairness foundations 
correspond closely to Shweder et al.’s (1997) ethic of autonomy, the ingroup and 
authority foundations are similar to the ethic of community, and the purity 
foundation includes moral concerns similar to those within the ethic of divinity. 
Haidt theorized that each moral foundation is based on different 
psychological mechanisms that evolved over time to promote individual 
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wellbeing and group functioning. The foundations produce intuitive views and 
judgments that sustain different aspects of a moral order. The set of five 
foundations, along with their evolutionary backdrops and roles in shaping moral 
systems, is called Moral Foundations Theory.  
 Haidt and Graham (2007) speculate the harm foundation emerged through 
evolution, beginning with the maternal concern for the suffering of one’s own 
offspring and since extending to a general dislike in seeing suffering in others. 
The foundation encourages the virtues of kindness and compassion and 
discourages the vices of cruelty and aggression. People who rated the harm 
foundation higher as an important factor in their moral judgments also scored 
higher on scales of empathy and benevolence and had more positive attitudes 
toward “caring” groups such as nurses, pacifists, and vegetarians (Graham et al., 
2011). Participants were also more likely to disapprove of animal testing, the 
death penalty, and the use of torture (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 
2012). 
 The fairness foundation evolved to allow unrelated individuals to mutually 
benefit from exchanging favors, goods, and services. The psychological 
mechanisms generating the foundation lead to judgments that favors should be 
returned and that cheating is wrong. The foundation is primarily found across 
cultures in the form of proportionality, wherein an act between individuals should 
be returned in kind, but has also been developed to certain degrees to include 
social justice concepts of equality. The fairness foundation can be seen in the 
behavior of students who worked on a proofreading task (Adams, 1963). When 
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the students felt they were being overpaid, they worked harder in order to reduce 
the perceived inequity between their lack of qualifications and the pay they were 
to receive for the task. Fairness means people should contribute to what they 
receive or offer something in return and may account for attitudes toward welfare. 
People who believe success in life should be based on one’s exerted efforts are 
less inclined to support welfare (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Fong, 2001).  
 The ingroup foundation comes from a long history of people living in 
small groups. Groups with members who could identify and trust each other and 
who would even be willing to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the group 
functioned well and prospered. The ingroup foundation’s psychological 
mechanisms promote the celebration of ingroup heroes and condemnation for 
those seen as disloyal to the group, especially in the context of a conflict with 
another group. People who reported the ingroup foundation as being particularly 
important for them also reported family and national security as being more 
important and reported more negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants 
(Graham et al., 2011) as well as more support for national defense spending 
(Koleva et al., 2012). People who score higher on measures of the ingroup 
foundation also tend to report higher identification with their favorite sports team 
(Winegard & Deaner, 2010). 
 The authority foundation is based on the advantage of having group 
members who can resolve disputes between other group members, can provide 
guidance, and can ensure that order exists within the group. The mechanisms of 
this moral foundation require authority figures to provide good leadership and to 
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promote the wellbeing of their group and subordinates. The foundation also 
requires followers to respect and obey the group’s authority figures. Aspects of 
the authority foundation are evident in views of civil responsibilities and rights. 
Coffe and Bolzendahl (2011) asked democrats, republicans, and independents to 
rate how important 10 behaviors were for a person “to be a good citizen.” Ratings 
were made on a scale of 0 to 6 and all three groups rated “always obey laws” 
above a five. Items such as voting in elections, helping other people in your 
country, and understanding the views of other citizens received lower scores. 
Coffe and Bolzendahl also asked about the obligations of government authorities. 
An item stating politicians should take into account the views of citizens before 
making decisions also scored above five for all three groups. People for whom the 
authority foundation is particularly important tend to score higher on Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism and on scales measuring the importance of social order, respect 
for tradition, honoring parents, and obedience (Graham et al., 2011). 
 The moral foundation of purity and sanctity evolved from the adaptive 
reaction to stimuli that could threaten the health of the body such as rotting foods, 
potentially disease ridden vomit, and creatures that may not avoid eating or 
touching such items (e.g., maggots). The tendencies of the purity mechanisms to 
protect the body extended to include feelings about the human spirit, to admire 
high culture, piety, and chastity, and to admonish disgraceful behaviors and carnal 
passions. The mechanisms of this foundation are also related to feelings of 
discomfort or disgust for physical and psychological abnormalities in others. The 
more the purity foundation is reported to be an important factor in moral 
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judgments, the more a person is likely to be opposed to cloning and stem cell 
research, as well as pornography and sexual relationships between people of the 
same sex (Koleva et al., 2012). People were also more likely to value self-
discipline and religious involvement, to have favorable attitudes toward spiritual 
people and virgins, and to have negative attitudes toward prostitutes and people 
with tattoos or piercings (Graham et al., 2011). 
 The individual experience of morality involves judgments of good and 
bad, right and wrong, and includes codes of behavior that apply to everyone. 
Moral violations are prevented and punished by moral systems made up of a 
group’s innate moral mechanisms and its social norms and institutions. More 
serious moral violations may be considered crimes and punished by a region’s 
criminal justice system. The punishment issued for a crime may not just depend 
on the extent of the moral violation, or generalized “seriousness” of the crime, 
however, but may also depend on the type of moral violation that occurred in the 
crime. Moral Foundations Theory provides a taxonomy of the moral domain by 
proposing five moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity. 
Different crimes can violate different moral principles, and it is possible the 
punishment goal desired by the public may vary depending on the type of moral 
violation. This paper will therefore position the appraisal of moral violations, 
using the five moral foundations, as the first link in the chain that connects crime 
to goals of punishment. 
 Forming general moral appraisals, and making moral judgments, however, 
is sometimes easier for people to do than to explain (Haidt, 2001; Haidt et al., 
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1993). The statement, “I don’t know why it’s wrong, but it’s wrong” is a platform 
often provided by people during morality debates (but is nonetheless an important 
one to social systems for estimating consensus and establishing moral orders). To 
understand the connection between crime, moral judgment, and punishment, it is 
therefore necessary to explore intuitive processes. 
Moral Judgments: Automatic, Intuitive Processes 
 Much of the research in decision making has focused on conscious 
reasoning and reflection processes as the systems that generate a person’s 
conclusions and judgments. Many researchers have begun to emphasize 
unconscious information processing systems, which can include emotional 
elements, as the principle factors that enable judgment. Zajonc (1980) argued that 
affective judgments precede cognitive operations in determining preferences, 
attitudes, and decisions. Furthermore, reactions with an affective basis are made 
sooner and produce greater confidence than cognitive judgments. Greenwald and 
Banaji (1995) suggested that much of social behavior, including attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes, is heavily influenced by past experiences operating 
through implicit mechanisms that are outside of the actor’s awareness. Bargh and 
Chartrand (1999) went a little further suggesting the conscious and intentional 
abilities are very limited and the vast majority of judgments, emotions, and 
behaviors are produced by unconscious mechanisms, or they would not occur at 
all. 
Damasio (1994) developed a neurological account of unconsciously driven 
decision making with his somatic marker hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, 
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life experiences produce pleasant and unpleasant feelings that may be felt strongly 
when the whole emotion system is engaged including the body and the somatic 
experiences it provides. Characteristics of a life experience are stored in memory 
along with the associated pleasant or unpleasant emotional state, or somatic 
marker. When contemplating a new decision, the characteristics of the decision 
that are similar to the characteristics of past experiences trigger the somatic states 
associated with the past experiences to a mild degree. The somatic markers 
culminate and produce for the decision maker positive or negative “gut feelings” 
toward the different options being contemplated in the decision task. With 
repeated experiences and repeated use of their somatic markers, the body proper 
(i.e., from the neck down) is removed from the process and the unconscious mind 
produces for the thinker favorable or unfavorable intuitions regarding decision 
scenarios. Studying participants with brain damage, Damasio found evidence that 
the ventromedial region of the prefrontal cortex (VMPC) is central to 
amalgamating somatic markers and presenting intuitions to the conscious mind. 
Koenigs and colleagues (Koenigs et al., 2007) found patients with damage to the 
VMPC applied a consistent utilitarian formula to resolve moral dilemmas 
whereby they chose the option that would maximize overall wellbeing and 
minimize overall harm and did not waver from this approach even when the 
option required the sacrifice of a human life. Those without VMPC damage 
experienced moral emotions that objected to aspects of the utilitarian option 
making the moral dilemma more difficult to resolve. 
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Haidt (2001) developed a social intuitionist model of moral judgment 
wherein intuitions lead to moral judgments. Conscious moral reasoning may then 
follow an intuitively derived judgment and be used to develop and articulate 
moral arguments for the purpose of convincing others of a judgment’s validity, 
but the conscious reasoning is not necessarily tied to the unconscious mechanisms 
that produced the judgment. The social aspect of the model depicts the effects that 
consciously produced moral arguments can have on the intuitions of others as 
they generate their own moral judgments. The bidirectional relationship between 
intuitive moral judgments and the social environment can stretch to the cultural 
level. Evolved genetic moral mechanisms of individuals influence the formation 
of cultural moral orders, and cultural moral emphases can shape the intuitive 
mechanisms of individual psychological judgments. 
The connection between crime, moral judgment, and punishment may 
therefore not depend as much on conscious reasoning abilities but more on 
intuitive processes including those involving emotion. Many researchers have 
suggested that emotions are not just meaningful end states to eliciting situations, 
but are integral and functional determinants of the decisions people make and the 
courses of action they take. People can have various emotional reactions to crimes 
and different emotions may contribute to different punishment goals being desired 
when moral violations occur at the criminal level. 
Functionalist Account of Emotion 
The functionalist perspective of emotion suggests that cognitive appraisals 
of objects and events elicit emotional states that carry with them goal-orientated 
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action tendencies (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Emotions may be differentiated in 
fact by the unique appraisal patterns that activate them and by the action 
tendencies they provide for fulfilling their functional purpose (Barrett & Campos, 
1987; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1985). For example, Devos, Silver, 
Mackie, & Smith (2003) found when people are confronted with a threat from 
another person, they may experience anger or fear. If they perceive their position 
to be stronger than that of the other, they will experience anger, and with anger 
comes a tendency to confront or aggress against the other. If they perceive their 
position to be weaker than the other, they will experience fear, and with fear 
comes a tendency to distance themselves from the other. 
Applying a functionalist perspective of emotion can inform community 
psychology theory and practice. The concept of community readiness refers to 
how much a group is aware of a problem and is prepared to address it. While 
evidence-based and strengths-based interventions to reduce criminal behavior are 
available, a lack of community readiness for applying the interventions can lead 
to failed attempts at applying the interventions or to not applying the interventions 
at all (Guerra & Backer, 2011; McCammon, 2012; Parker, Alcaraz, & Payne, 
2011). Assessing and developing community readiness for the application of 
criminal sentences that are effective in reducing crime are necessary components 
of crime prevention. By considering public appraisals of crimes and offenders 
along with the public’s emotional reactions, the assessment of community 
readiness can be more precise and strategies for developing community readiness 
can be more informed. 
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Observed events that are unexpected, negative, or important, such as 
moral violations, are particularly likely to increase attention and activate cognitive 
and emotional mechanisms (Weiner, 1985). Given that moral outlooks include a 
universal quality, it is not surprising that violations of moral principles, even 
when they are distal events, often elicit intuitive emotional responses from third 
parties who are then in a state of action readiness for responding to the eliciting 
event. Emotions may therefore play a role in the connection between crime and 
punishment, but more must be known about appraisals in order to understand 
when a distinct emotion, with its individual functional purpose, will be elicited. 
Most studies of emotion that apply a functionalist perspective consider the 
cognitive appraisals to occur in a single step (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Some 
functionalist models of emotion, however, have proposed that the appraisals 
preceding emotions occur in two stages of increasing cognitive complexity (e.g., 
Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1985). 
Weiner (1985, 1986) developed the causal attribution theory of emotion to 
represent the connections between appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies. 
According to attribution theory, an observed event is initially assessed for whether 
it is positive or negative. Depending on the appraisal outcome of the first stage, a 
general positive (e.g., happy) or negative (e.g., sad) emotion is experienced. 
During the second appraisal stage, additional factors are considered that then lead 
to a wider range of differentiated emotional experiences. The second appraisal 
stage results in determinations of what is responsible for the event and 
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expectancies of whether the cause can change. Emotional outcomes of the second 
stage of appraisals include pride, shame, gratitude, pity, hopefulness, 
hopelessness, and others. 
Weiner proposed that during the second stage of appraisals, the cause of 
the observed event is assessed according to five dimensional properties. How an 
event is perceived on the five causal dimensions then determines the specific 
emotion experienced. Weiner further suggests that while people are capable of 
developing a vast number of causal explanations to account for the full range of 
human behaviors, these causes can all be characterized by the five dimensional 
properties. By applying this type of concise model of causality, one is able to 
explain why qualitatively different events can elicit the same emotional reactions. 
Weiner’s (1985) five dimensions of causality are locus, controllability, 
intentionality, stability, and globality. Locus refers to whether the cause is internal 
or external to a person. Controllability pertains to the notion that people have 
volitional control over aspects of their conduct. Intentionality refers to the 
intended goal of a behavior. Stability is a measure of how constant the cause of an 
event is over time, and globality considers whether the cause is constant across 
situations. 
Attributions of locus, controllability, and intentionality have implications 
for assigning causal responsibility while stability, and perhaps globality, affect 
expectancies with whether one’s actions can influence the cause and thereby 
change future events. Depending on the secondary appraisals, different actions 
will be required of the person, and different emotions will serve as mediators 
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between the secondary appraisal patterns and the adaptive action tendencies that 
are produced. 
Lazarus (1991) also proposed a two-stage appraisal model of emotion with 
three types of appraisals occurring in each stage. The first stage includes the 
primary appraisals which are determining whether an event is personally relevant, 
whether an event is in line or inconsistent with personal goals, and thirdly the 
specific type of goal, which Lazarus mentioned could be moral values. The 
emotional outcomes of primary appraisals are general positive or negative affects 
depending on whether the stimulus is congruent or incongruent with personally 
relevant interests. A greater range of emotions emanate from the secondary 
appraisals. The three secondary appraisals include appraising who or what is 
responsible for the event, what can be done to address the event, and what is 
likely to happen in the future. 
 This paper will apply a two-stage appraisal sequence to investigate public 
reactions to criminal offenders borrowing ideas from Weiner (1985, 1986) and 
Lazarus (1991). In the first appraisal stage, an event is assessed for how it is 
consistent or inconsistent with personal goals. Moral violations, a component of 
criminal events, are inconsistent with personally relevant and valued principles. 
The degree to which a crime violates each of the five categories of moral concerns 
provided by Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt and Graham, 2007) will therefore 
be used to assess the primary appraisals of a criminal event. It will then be 
determined if the primary appraisals themselves lead to distinct secondary 
appraisal patterns. Although various forms of additional information can affect 
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secondary appraisals, media accounts of crimes often only report the type of 
crime committed, with more extensive information being provided to judges and 
juries for their deliberation. Public reactions to crimes can readily occur 
nonetheless with more diverse responses than just positive or negative affective 
states. Secondary appraisals allow for a wider range of emotions and subsequent 
action tendencies so it is possible that the type of moral code violated by a crime 
allows for more complex secondary appraisals to be made. Secondary appraisal 
variables have been developed for this paper based on research reviews of moral 
psychology, emotion, and punishment goals.  
Secondary Appraisals 
The punishment goals of a criminal justice system are oriented toward 
preserving and protecting a society’s moral order. Violations and threats to a 
moral order can include the occurrence of immoral acts, the potential for immoral 
acts to occur, and the presence of immoral entities within the moral order. 
Detection of a particular type of threat may elicit a particular emotional response 
that carries with it a unique state of action readiness for responding to the threat. 
Secondary appraisals of an offender may therefore consist of perceiving the 
offender as having committed an immoral act, as being incompetent in abiding by 
moral principles, and as possessing a nature of an immoral quality. The secondary 
appraisals presented in this paper include elements of the secondary appraisals 
presented in the models of emotion proposed by Weiner (1985, 1986) and Lazarus 
(1991), which included determining the cause of an event, assessing the nature of 
the cause, and considering how the cause may be subject to change. 
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The secondary appraisals that are proposed to occur in the public are 
relevant to community psychology values as they can include elements of 
prejudice toward the offender that may be enduring, remaining as appraisals of 
the offender long after the crime and punishment have passed. Public appraisals 
of moral incompetence and an immoral nature can lead to the disempowerment of 
an offender and reduce the offender’s chances for securing employment, building 
social capital, and experiencing a sense of community (Chavis & Wandersman, 
1990; McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Rappaport, 1981; Sarason, 1974; Zimmerman, 
2000). Identifying such appraisals, determining the contributing factors to their 
onset, and assessing how they lead to specific emotions and action tendencies 
toward offenders is imperative for understanding and modifying maladapted 
punishment strategies of the criminal justice system as well as prejudicial and 
hostile social experiences offenders may encounter after they complete their 
sentences. 
The three secondary appraisals of immoral behavior, moral incompetence, 
and immoral nature may seem similar in certain respects to the primary appraisals 
of moral violation type, and in fact each of the five primary appraisals may 
predict each of the secondary appraisals. The three appraisals of the offender are 
classified as separate secondary appraisals, however, because it is anticipated that 
the five types of moral violation will predict the secondary appraisals to different 
degrees (Figure 1), and the secondary appraisals will each predict distinct 
emotional responses to different degrees. The secondary appraisals, and what they 
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mean regarding perceptions of the offender, are therefore important for 
understanding the connections between crime and goals of punishment. 
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Figure 1.  Proposed model of moral foundations and secondary appraisals. 
Immoral act.  Public reactions to the perpetrator of a crime can be partly 
based on the degree to which the offender’s actions are perceived to be an 
immoral act. Although the act would have already occurred, responding to the 
immoral acts of individuals can be necessary for reinstating a moral balance. 
Often a crime is a direct act against another individual, and by committing the 
wrong the offender has elevated him or herself above the victim. By returning to 
the offender a punishment that is comparable to the wrongfulness of the crime, the 
disturbed moral balance between parties is restored (De Keijser et al., 2002; 
Vidmar & Miller, 1980). 
Public concern for a wrongdoing may not only be on behalf of an 
individual victim, however, but also on behalf of society. In committing a crime, 
an offender acted against and violated important social rules shared and relied on 
by the general public. By committing the crime, the offender acted against and 
wronged society’s laws and therefore elevated him or herself above a perhaps 
more important victim, society’s social order. Weiner (2006) captures this 
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concern by pointing out that when calls for justice are made by the public, public 
concern is for “the victim (which is ultimately society itself)” (p. 135). Appraising 
the degree to which the individual offender has committed an immoral act is 
therefore a secondary appraisal with implications for emotional and behavioral 
responses aimed at addressing the immoral act. 
It is predicted that harm and fairness violations will be the moral 
violations most strongly associated with the secondary appraisal of a person 
committing an immoral act, and these relations will be positive. Third-party 
appraisals of an immoral act may be associated more strongly with harm and 
fairness violations because of a stronger public concern with these aspects of the 
moral order, especially in the context of crime. Neuberg and Cottrell (2003) have 
argued for a hierarchy of threat wherein people are more attuned to threats against 
individual security, followed by threats to group security, and ending with threats 
to socialization mechanisms and authority structures. 
Moral incompetence.  Determining an offender’s level of moral 
competency is relevant to expectancies regarding the offender’s future conduct 
and the social trust the public can have in the offender. Competency refers to 
possessing the knowledge, skill, or capacity of sufficient quantity to adequately 
perform a task. People who possess the competencies for certain tasks can be 
approached for their abilities and assistance and included in more permanent 
social relations. Those who are incompetent may be avoided for their risk of 
wasting time and resources and their potential for interfering with valued goals 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).  
36 
 
Moral competency refers to the ability to perform moral actions and to 
avoid moral violations. Moral incompetence can be due to an inability to learn, 
understand, or follow the codes of a moral order. The appraisal of moral 
incompetence in others can serve a moral-functional role by protecting people and 
social orders against those who have demonstrated a deficiency in some moral 
capacity. The appraisal of moral incompetence also includes the attribution of a 
somewhat stable characteristic to the offender and can lead to emotions and action 
tendencies for protecting society from the offender’s potential moral failings. 
The appraisal of moral incompetence may be especially likely to result 
from repeated moral violations but could also result from a single violation. It is 
hypothesized that violations of ingroup and authority moral codes will be the 
strongest predictors of a moral incompetence appraisal. Ingroup and authority 
moral foundations are based on the conception of a person as filling a role within 
a socially interdependent community. Each person has various roles within their 
social groups and social structures and each role carries certain responsibilities 
and expectations. Unlike harm violations, which require an offender to commit a 
harmful act, ingroup and authority violations can occur simply by failing to 
perform an act, or by simple negligence, and could therefore more readily lead to 
appraisals of moral incompetence. 
Furthermore, the commission of a crime itself is a violation of authority 
principles. Laws are an authoritative institution, set by the rightful role of 
legislative bodies and established to provide for the wellbeing of the institutions’ 
subordinates. The act of breaking a law is an act of disobeying a legitimate 
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authority and could lead to an appraisal of moral incompetence by showing the 
offender cannot follow the rules put in place for the group and fill the role of a 
law-abiding citizen. 
Immoral nature.  People not only appraise the actions and competencies 
of others but also their nature. Humans can be conceptualized as spiritual entities 
holding an elevated status within a sacred order, which includes other beings such 
as demons, animals, and angels (Brandt & Reyna, 2011; Shweder et al., 1997). 
Forming judgments of a person’s moral nature can be as important to a social 
group as forming judgments of a person’s moral competence. Determining 
whether a group member is morally competent can be important for establishing 
trust in social interactions and for protecting the social functioning of the group. 
Assessing a group member’s moral nature can be important for protecting the 
integrity and shared essence of the group. In a theory of moral motives proposed 
by Rai and Fiske (2011), and based on Fiske’s relational models theory (Fiske, 
1991; Fiske & Haslam, 2005), the ingroup and purity moral foundations are 
combined into a unity moral motive. Guided by the unity motive, people in an in-
group not only feel loyalty and collective responsibility to the group but also that 
the group has a communal essence that needs to be protected. The unity motive 
can lead a group to protect itself from outsiders, such as by preventing inter-ethnic 
marriages and pursuing ethnic cleansing, and to protect itself from impure 
insiders. If an in-group member commits a moral violation, the entire group “feels 
tainted and shamed until it cleanses itself” (Rai & Fiske, 2011, p. 61). Appraisals 
of an offender’s moral essence may therefore lead to distinct emotions and 
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behavioral tendencies in the surrounding public that could have significant 
implications for an offender. 
Hutcherson and Gross (2011) investigated whether the concept of an 
immoral nature is a relevant factor to appraisals and emotions. In one study, 
participants were asked to indicate which emotion they preferred someone felt 
toward them. Six emotions were used and were presented to the participants in 
pairs. After each choice, participants were asked to explain their decision. The 
responses were coded using nine themes, one of which was whether the emotion 
“was indicative of one’s moral sense or character.” The moral character theme 
was particularly present in choices involving disgust. Another study asked 
participants to recall an event when someone else did something that had a 
negative impact on them (the participant), an event when someone else acted in an 
incompetent manner, and an event when someone else did something immoral. 
After describing each event, participants responded to questions about their 
emotional responses and appraisals to the events. One question asked whether the 
event changed their impression of the actor’s moral character and another asked 
how generally immoral they thought the person was. Both appraisals were related 
to the emotion items and were particularly associated with feelings of disgust. 
It is hypothesized that violations of the purity moral foundation will be the 
primary appraisal that has the strongest association with the appraisal of an 
immoral nature. The purity foundation includes concerns with protecting the 
dignity and sanctity of the human body and the elevated essence of a human’s 
spiritual core. The event of a purity violation can indicate a person may be guided 
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by a depraved nature or can otherwise attach defilement or degradation to the 
person. 
Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2011) asked participants to read scenarios of 
harm and purity moral violations and then answer appraisal questions. Two 
appraisal items assessed the harm done in the scenario, three items measured the 
intent of the actor, and four items formed an “abnormality” appraisal scale and 
asked whether the actor “is abnormal,” “is a lesser human being,” “has become 
impure,” and “appears to be mentally unstable.” It was found that the purity 
violation was associated with higher “abnormality” scores than the harm 
violation. 
Crimes can vary by the types of moral principles they violate, and the 
nature of a crime may influence the appraisals that are made of the offender. 
Following a two-stage model of appraisal, moral foundations will be used as 
primary appraisals of a crime, and perceptions of the offender’s behavior, 
competencies, and nature will be used as secondary appraisals. Having appraised 
an event, a person may then experience a distinct emotion which carries its own 
action tendency for responding to the event. The various action tendencies 
provided by the functionalist account of emotion may account for the different 
goals of punishment that are desired by the general public when it comes to 
sanctioning a criminal offender. 
Emotions 
Categories of emotions have been developed based on the common 
functions the emotions serve. Many emotions, such as fear and happiness, serve 
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purposes directly relevant to the self. Fear, for example, occurs when something 
important to the self is threatened and removing the self from the threat is a viable 
course of action. Happiness occurs when something of personal value is gained 
and is accompanied by tendencies to pursue similar tasks or objects or to share the 
event with others, serving the purpose of strengthening social ties. 
 Social emotions are those that serve social purposes in the relations 
between individuals and between groups (Ekman, 1992). They have even been 
defined as those emotions that are elicited by appraising the mental states of 
others (Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, & Blakemore, 2008). Embarrassment, for 
example, is felt when a person believes that others see him or herself as acting 
foolishly, with the action tendency to stop the behavior and possibly repair the 
damage to the self’s social image. 
Moral emotions are closely tied to social emotions. Haidt (2003) defines 
moral emotions as those elicited by events that do not directly affect the self or 
those closely connected to the self but motivate actions that either benefit others 
or uphold and benefit the social order. The more an emotion is initiated by an 
event that does not directly impact the self as an individual yet leads to prosocial 
action tendencies, the more it would be a prototypical moral emotion. 
Compassion, for example, can be elicited by the suffering of those one has never 
met before and provides a motivational state to help remedy the eliciting situation. 
Some emotions are certainly not confined to one functional domain. 
Anger, for example, can be a self-directed emotion, a social emotion, and a moral 
emotion. Anger can be directed at the self when one fails at something important 
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and thinks the self is to blame. Anger can be considered a social emotion, such as 
when a person thinks another deliberately harmed them and they want to take 
revenge. Anger can also be a moral emotion. When a person hears about an 
injustice in society involving people he or she does not know, anger could be felt 
along with a desire to take action against the injustice. 
Attention to moral emotions and their connections to prosocial or 
antisocial behavior had been mainly limited to empathy, guilt, and sympathy prior 
to the 1980s, but has since expanded. Haidt (2003) delineates four families of 
moral emotions: the “self-conscious” emotions of embarrassment, guilt, and 
shame; the “other-praising” moral emotions of gratitude and elevation; the “other-
condemning” moral emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust; and the “other-
suffering” family centered on sympathy. As examples of the functional account of 
emotion, the self-conscious and other-praising emotions will be discussed briefly. 
Within the self-conscious moral emotions, shame is elicited when a person 
appraises the self as not measuring up to a moral standard, embarrassment may 
occur when one’s social identity during an interaction is damaged (Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996; Keltner & Buswell, 1997), and guilt results from seeing one’s 
actions as violating a moral rule, particularly involving harm to another person 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Shame and embarrassment create a 
desire to withdraw or a tendency toward meekness that signals to others the 
awareness of committing a fault and that actions from others are unnecessary to 
correct the wrong (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The action tendencies of shame are 
stronger than for embarrassment and may even lead to self-destructive behavior 
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such as suicide (Mokros, 1995). Guilt involves the tendency toward corrective 
action to repair the harm done by a moral violation (Baumeister et al., 1994). 
In the other-praising family of emotions, gratitude is elicited by 
determining that another has assisted the self and generates a tendency to thank 
the benefactor or to return the favor (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & 
Larson, 2001). Elevation comes from seeing moral beauty in another as a result of 
exceptional moral behavior such as kindness or self-sacrifice. The feeling of 
elevation includes feelings of affection toward the eliciting person but also a 
tendency to follow the example of the elevated by improving on one’s own moral 
behaviors (Haidt, 2003). 
This paper will investigate five emotions because of their relevance to 
crime and goals of punishment. The emotions include the other-condemning 
moral emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust, the other-suffering emotion of 
sympathy, and the self-protecting emotion of fear. 
Anger.  Anger is often a response to unjustified, negative actions that are 
directed at the self, such as being insulted, laughed at, lied to, betrayed, stolen 
from, or otherwise treated unfairly (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; 
Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Izard, 1977; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 
1987). Unfairness and general immorality have been found to elicit anger in a 
variety of cultures (Scherer, 1997). Actions against one’s social group elicit anger 
as well. Threats to group safety, possessions, rights, values, and social 
coordination have the potential to produce anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
Anger can even be felt by people not directly involved in the event. Witnessing 
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one person harming another can elicit anger (Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, & Luo, 
2006; Kedia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot, 2008). Also, racism, 
oppression, and exploitation can garner high levels of anger in people who are not 
within the victimized group (Haidt, 2003). 
Anger is often thought of as an immoral emotion because of the violence, 
harm, and destruction it can cause, but it can also be thought of as a moral 
emotion as it is also a response to immoral actions and tied to the emotivational 
state of wanting to address and correct a wrongdoing (Haidt 2003; Tavris, 1982). 
Anger is therefore a natural emotion elicited in the public when crimes occur. In 
committing a crime, an offender has committed a wrongdoing not only recognized 
by society but also the legal system. Just breaking a law itself can be perceived as 
a moral violation as it disrespects the social order and the traditions of the group, 
thus violating principles stemming from the ingroup and authority moral 
foundations. 
Anger is in response to an injustice and a number of qualifiers can modify 
the appraisal of an injustice including Weiner’s (1985, 2006) causal attributions of 
intentionality and controllability. Judgments of the moral wrongfulness of an act 
depend to a large degree on the understanding that the act was committed by a 
moral agent who has the human faculties of self- and moral-awareness and 
operates by willful actions. Natural disasters that kill thousands of people are not 
considered immoral events, the actions of animals are rarely perceived through a 
moral lens, and crimes by people with mental disorders affecting information 
processing systems can lead to deliberations of moral responsibility. Reducing the 
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intentionality and controllability behind a wrongdoing has reduced judgments of 
responsibility (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Weiner, 2006; Weiner, Graham, 
& Reyna, 1997), feelings of anger (Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2008; Rudolph, 
Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; Wickens, 
Wiesenthal, Flora, & Flett, 2011), and severity of assigned punishment (Palazzolo 
& Roberto, 2011; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Wickens et al., 2011). While reducing 
the perpetrator’s intentionality and controllability reduces perceptions of 
wrongdoing and feelings of anger, the level of an offender’s intent and control are 
not always presented to the public for consideration but rather are deliberated and 
established by a judge or jury during the course of a trial. 
Intent and control are also not mandatory for culpability to be assigned 
and punishment issued. Przygotski and Mullet (1993) found manipulations of 
harm and intent combined additively in predicting punishment, and even harmful 
events with no intent to harm still resulted in some punishment being assigned. 
Cushman (2008) found that while intent was related to judgments of an action’s 
wrongfulness, when it came to assigning blame and punishment the mere 
consequence of the act played a role as well. Also, Ask and Pina (2011) found 
participants’ level of state anger before appraising a criminal act influenced 
attributions of intentionality and controllability, suggesting that anger felt in 
response to a harmful act can then lead to attributions of intent and control. 
Intentionality and controllability are foundational components of the 
concept of moral agency, and the moral agency of a person is important for 
passing moral judgment on the person’s behavior. However, I believe that actions 
45 
 
in violation of moral principles, whether intended or not, can activate the moral-
psychological mechanisms in observers designed to protect the moral order by 
addressing all moral violations. In fact, there may even be a bias toward assuming 
that intentionality and controllability exist in order to err on the side of addressing 
all possible injustices rather than allowing any immoral action to go unchecked. 
The action tendency typically associated with anger is a general readiness 
to aggress against the source of the injustice (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Izard, 
1977; Shaver et al., 1987). With anger comes a desire to attack, punish, or enact 
revenge for a perceived wrong or injustice, an emotion-behavior link found in a 
variety of cultures (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In a 
comparison with fear, sadness, disgust, frustration, regret, and guilt, feelings of 
anger were more connected with thoughts of how unfair something was and 
wanting to hurt or get back at someone (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). 
Due to the connection between anger and the perception of a wrong, it is 
predicted that the appraisal of an immoral act will be the secondary appraisal most 
strongly related to anger (Figure 2). Anger can serve a moral-functional purpose 
by being elicited in response to the appraisal that a moral agent committed a 
moral violation and provides a behavioral readiness to aggress against the violator 
for the sake of addressing the violation. The path model presented in this paper 
also shows a relation between harm and fairness violations and anger (mediated 
by the appraisal of an immoral act). Prior research has found harmful and unfair 
acts against individuals to be associated with feelings of anger in third parties, and 
more so than for feelings of contempt and disgust (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 
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2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Russell 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2011). 
Primary Appraisals    Secondary Appraisals         Emotions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Proposed model of moral foundations, secondary appraisals, and 
emotions. 
Fear.  Fear is primarily elicited when there is a threat to one’s physical 
safety and leads to a desire to escape from the threatening stimulus (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005). Generally fear is experienced when there is a threat to something 
valuable and it is determined that the threat cannot be stopped so escape is 
required (Devos et al., 2003). Fear can be experienced when there is uncertainty 
about the future or one’s general wellbeing (Roseman et al., 1994). Also, threats 
to group values, social coordination, and social trust may elicit fear (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005). 
 Studies investigating fear and crime have generally measured participants’ 
“fear of crime,” which may refer to a general sense of safety in their 
neighborhoods or to concern with being the victim of a crime. This 
conceptualization of fear fits the self-protective function of fear to arouse and 
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prepare the individual against potential threats that, once they have commenced, 
one may not be able to avoid or overcome (Lazarus, 1991). 
It is predicted that the appraisal of an immoral act will be the strongest 
predictor of fear. Perceiving an immoral act committed by another individual may 
inform a person of a general danger that exists in society, producing in the 
observer a general concern with being the victim of a crime. Being the victim of a 
crime or exposed to crime, perceiving social disorder in the surrounding 
community, and local crime rates have all been positively related to the fear of 
crime (Liu, Messner, Zhang, & Zhuo, 2009; Riger, LeBailly, & Gordon, 1981; 
Roccato, Russo, & Vieno, 2011; Russo, Roccato, & Vieno, 2011; Thompson & 
Norris, 1992). Taking protective measures or developing safeguards to manage 
the threat ahead of time can be action tendencies associated with fear. 
Contempt.  Contempt is generally considered to be an emotion falling 
between anger and disgust and has at different times been said to be based on 
anger (Lazarus, 1991) and a variant of disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). 
However, contempt has also been found to be elicited by appraisals different than 
those for anger and disgust (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999), has 
been associated with its own unique facial expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; 
Ekman & Heider, 1988), and leads to distinct action tendencies (Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011). 
The emotion of contempt brings a psychological separation between the 
individual and the elicitor and instills a downward, judgmental comparison. 
Targets of contempt are perceived as morally inferior and less worthy of respect 
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and warmth (Ekman, 1994; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
1995; Smith, 2000). Fischer and Roseman (2007) found people feeling contempt 
for someone wanted to ignore the person and to have nothing to do with them. 
Contempt can also be involved in a desire to restrict the target’s access to certain 
positions (Devos et al., 2003). 
Contempt can be elicited by perceiving someone as not measuring up to a 
certain standard. Those who are not fulfilling the responsibilities of their job or 
role, do not have the abilities required of them, take credit for something they did 
not do, or do not meet certain moral expectations can be the targets of contempt 
(Haidt, 2003; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004). Hutcherson and Gross (2011) found 
contempt, more so than anger and disgust, to be related to appraisals of 
incompetence. Contempt can last longer than anger and is less likely to change. 
Situations that elicit contempt for a person are less likely to be resolved than those 
eliciting anger and the person is more likely to be perceived as having a stable, 
negative disposition (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). 
Contempt can serve a moral-functional role by protecting people and 
social orders against those who have demonstrated a deficiency in some social-
moral capacity but do not pose a malicious threat (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). 
People who have committed moral violations by being negligent or not measuring 
up to their moral responsibilities given their particular role within a social order 
can be marked with a feeling of contempt and managed through contempt’s action 
tendencies. 
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Contempt can interfere with the goals of community psychology by 
leading to the social exclusion of an offender. Developing social capital and 
positive social ties are related to positive mental health and have also been shown 
to reduce violent acts and other forms of antisocial behavior (Schofield et al., 
2012; Vieno et al., 2010; Zeldin, 2004). 
In the case of criminal behavior, an appraisal of moral incompetence may 
therefore be a cognitive antecedent to a feeling of contempt. Moral incompetence 
refers to the inability to follow moral rules or fulfill moral responsibilities. People 
who do not have the abilities required of them or otherwise do not meet their 
responsibilities can elicit contempt in others (Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004). 
Contempt may be particularly connected to the actions, or inactions, of a 
person who is considered a member of a social group. The ingroup and authority 
moral foundations pertain to the moral expectations of a person as a community 
member. Ingroup violations include violations of group loyalty and not acting in 
the interests of the ingroup. Authority violations consist of not fulfilling the 
responsibilities of one’s role within a social hierarchy. The path model shows a 
relation between violations of ingroup and authority codes and the feeling of 
contempt (mediated by the appraisal of moral incompetence), which is a relation 
that has been demonstrated in prior research by Rozin and colleagues (Rozin et 
al., 1999). The researchers found violations of ingroup and authority codes 
elicited feelings of contempt to a greater degree than feelings of anger and disgust 
for both American and Japanese participants. It is hypothesized that moral 
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incompetence will be positively related to contempt because the offender is seen 
as not measuring up to the expectations of him or her as a member of a moral 
order. The appraisal of moral incompetence could also lead to sympathy, 
however, if the incompetent person is seen as being in need. 
Sympathy.  Sympathy is elicited by appraising a state of suffering or 
distress in another person and develops a desire to help or comfort the sufferer 
and to alleviate the sufferer’s condition (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). A 
main determinant of whether another’s condition elicits sympathy is whether the 
person is responsible for the condition. If the person’s distress is caused by the 
environment or factors outside the person’s control than sympathy rather than 
blame is more likely to occur (Graham et al., 1997; Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2008; 
Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Rudolph et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2011). 
The secondary appraisal of moral incompetence may be related to 
sympathy. If the incompetence is seen as something the person cannot control or 
could overcome if given assistance and the chance to improve, then sympathy 
would increase. Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2003) found a positive relation between 
the perception of incompetence and the feeling of sympathy for populations such 
as the elderly and people with disabilities. 
It is also predicted that the appraisal of an immoral nature will be 
negatively related to sympathy. Reed and Aquino (2003) found people were more 
willing to help those who were considered to be within the help-giver’s circle of 
moral regard. As the perceived moral essence of a person diminishes, the person 
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may be seen as falling outside the circle of moral regard, and concern for the 
person’s welfare may then decline.  
Disgust.  Disgust is a feeling of revulsion. Disgust is often elicited by 
physical objects such as rotting foods, maggots, and rats that may carry diseases 
or otherwise make the body sick. Disgust’s core connection with threats to 
physical health has expanded, however, into social and moral life (Haidt, Rozin, 
McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Disgust is not only felt toward hazardous physical 
objects but to violations and threats to human dignity, group values, and moral 
standards (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devos et al., 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). 
Infringements of cultural rules governing body mutations, hygiene, and sexual 
acts, as well as offensive political attitudes, can lead to disgust (Haidt et al., 1997; 
MacCoun, 1998). Disgust is the emotional response to a “risk of being 
contaminated by an indigestible or poisonous idea” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 260). 
Action tendencies connected to disgust include the desires to avoid or 
expel the offensive entity (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devos et al., 2003; Rozin, 
Haidt, & McCauley, 1993). The revulsion of disgust keeps people away from 
physical hazards to bodily health, causes people to recoil at the degradation of 
human dignity, and leads groups to expunge contaminants of the social-moral 
order. Disgust’s tendency to avoid or remove contaminants suggests the target of 
disgust is perceived as being or holding an impurity. It is therefore hypothesized 
that the secondary appraisal of an immoral nature will be the strongest predictor 
of disgust. Unlike anger which addresses an immoral act, disgust functions by 
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condemning people “for what they are, not just for what they do” (Haidt, 2003, p. 
857). 
Disgust may be particularly connected to violations of the purity moral 
foundation. Violations of purity include not conducting oneself in accordance 
with the concepts of dignity, civility and culture, and the spiritually elevated 
status that differentiates humans from animals. The path model shows a relation 
between purity violations and disgust (mediated by the appraisal of an immoral 
nature). Disgust has been found to have a stronger empirical connection with 
purity violations than other emotions including anger, contempt, and fear 
(Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Horberg et al., 2009; Moll et al., 2005; Rozin et 
al., 1999; Schaich Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008). Hutcherson and Gross 
(2011) asked participants to recall events that had elicited feelings of anger, 
contempt, and disgust and found that when participants felt disgust for someone 
they were more likely to see the person as having an immoral or offensive 
character. Disgust was also least likely to be affected by an apology, and not 
surprisingly, participants least preferred to be the target of disgust. Russell and 
Giner-Sorolla (2011) had participants read scenarios of a person committing 
moral violations and then respond to appraisal and emotion questions. The 
appraisal that the person had an abnormal nature mediated the relation between 
purity violations and feelings of disgust. 
Public disgust can interfere with the community psychology goal of 
reintegrating offenders into the community. Public opposition to offender 
reintegration may be particularly high when disgust is experienced, which may 
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result after perceiving a purity violation such as substance abuse or sexual 
deviance. As an example, efforts to establish group homes for people with 
substance abuse histories and other past deviancies have experienced substantial 
neighborhood opposition and municipality interference (Jason et al., 2008). 
To summarize, the functionalist account of emotion suggests that emotions 
are elicited by appraisals and lead to action tendencies. Appraisals of crimes can 
include determinations regarding the types of moral principles violated by the 
crime along with appraisals of the offender’s actions, competencies, and moral 
nature. Appraisals of the offender may then elicit anger, fear, contempt, 
sympathy, or disgust. Each emotion has its own action tendencies that are goal-
oriented and intended to provide an adaptive response to the eliciting event. The 
emotions just described will be used to predict the punishment goals of the 
criminal justice system that are desired by the public.  
Goals of Punishment 
Moral principles are upheld within a moral order, in part, by group 
members reprimanding moral violations. Reprimands occur on a regular basis 
through social reprisals ranging from dirty looks to ostracism. For more serious 
moral rules requiring more severe reprisals, or for those requiring a more 
systematic method of enforcement, a society can develop laws and a legal system 
to address legal violations. 
Legal punishment is a societal response to those individuals who commit 
illegal acts. A punishment can be issued for a variety of purposes such as 
discouraging people from committing similar crimes or confining an offender in 
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order to protect society. The typical goals of punishment identified in psychology 
and legal literatures are retribution, general deterrence, individual deterrence, 
rehabilitation, restoration, and incapacitation (e.g., De Keijser et al., 2002; 
Hogarth, 1971; McFatter, 1982). 
Retribution 
Retribution is punishing for the purpose of equalizing the wrong 
committed by the offender. In the course of a crime, an offender has harmed 
another person or in some way violated the communal values or moral codes of 
society. The offender not only wronged another party, but in doing so put him or 
herself above the other party (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The retributive response to 
a crime bestows suffering on an offender for the purpose of restoring a disturbed 
moral balance (De Keijser et al., 2002). The retribution goal of punishment is 
often the one in mind when calls for “justice” are made and a retributive 
punishment is sometimes referred to as “just deserts.” For a punishment to satisfy 
the retribution goal, it is important for the suffering inflicted on the offender to be 
proportional to the wrongfulness of the crime. The wrongfulness of a criminal act 
depends both on the severity of the moral violation and on the deliberateness of 
the act (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). By inflicting suffering on the 
offender, proportional harm is returned to the offender and the status between the 
offender and the victim is restored. After receiving the punishment an offender 
has “paid the debt owed to society.” 
It is hypothesized that anger will be the emotion that will most strongly 
predict the goal of retribution (Figure 3). The functional purpose and action 
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tendency of anger is to aggress against the perpetrator of a moral violation. Anger 
produces a tendency to harm a moral offender, which can serve to equate the 
distribution of negative experiences and thus equalize the moral position of 
offender and victim (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Once a 
punishment is completed, the goal of retribution is achieved, so anger would 
subside. Anger has in fact been found to be more changeable in response to 
punishment than contempt and disgust. Anger produces a short-term attack 
tendency but once retributive justice is attained, anger fades while other emotions 
may remain (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Russell & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2011). 
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Figure 3.  Proposed model of moral foundations, secondary appraisals, emotions, and punishment goals. 
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General and Individual Deterrence 
The goal of deterrence is to prevent future crimes. General deterrence 
refers to discouraging other potential offenders in the general public from 
committing a crime and individual deterrence refers to dissuading the individual 
offender from reoffending. Both deterrence goals are achieved by issuing 
punishments severe enough to convince people the crimes are not worth 
committing or that “crime doesn’t pay.” The goal of deterrence rests on the 
assumption that crimes are committed by rational actors who can consider a priori 
the costs and benefits of the criminal act. By providing punishments unpleasant 
enough to outweigh the potential gains from a crime, people will be deterred from 
criminal activity. The more severe a punishment, the more effective it will be in 
achieving the goal of deterrence.  
For general deterrence, the goal is directed toward the potential criminality 
within the general public and the threat of punishment should be publicized to 
achieve the goal (Carlsmith, 2006). The individual crime and culpability of the 
offender has less influence on the goal of general deterrence and a desire to 
pursue this goal could overrule the rights of the offender. For individual 
deterrence, the goal of punishment is directed toward the individual offender and 
the issued sanction is a direct lesson about what will happen if the criminal 
offends again. 
Despite the aims of deterrence, excessive pursuit of these goals can 
interfere with community psychology goals and values. Long periods of 
imprisonment can reduce an offender’s employment opportunities, develop a 
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deviant self-concept, and impede positive social relationships which can reduce 
offender wellbeing and may increase recidivism (Astone, 1982; Baillargeon et al., 
2012; Chu et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2008; Fite et al., 2012; Martin et al., 1978; 
Nikulina et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 1981; Pager, 2003; Vaux & Ruggiero, 1983). 
It is predicted that fear will be the emotion most strongly associated with 
the goal of general deterrence. Action tendencies of fear include taking protective 
measures or developing safeguards to manage a threat ahead of time. In the 
context of crime, instituting behavioral controls for reducing criminal tendencies 
within the general public may be associated with a fear of crime. Severe 
punishments and statutes requiring stiff penalties are factors related to general 
deterrence (Carlsmith, 2008) and the fear of crime has been found to be positively 
related to punishment severity and support for capital punishment (Keil & Vito, 
1991; Klama & Egan, 2011; Sims, 2003). 
Ouimet and Coyle (1991) did not find a connection between the public’s 
fear of crime and punishment severity, but did find that perceptions of the public’s 
fear of crime held by court practitioners (i.e., judges, prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and probation officers) was positively related to the punishment severity 
of sentences suggested by the practitioners. The study’s findings reinforce the two 
propositions that public opinion can influence criminal justice practices and that 
individual cognitive appraisals of the environment are important antecedents to 
behavior tendencies. 
It is also predicted that contempt will be the emotion most strongly 
associated with the goal of individual deterrence. Moral incompetence may be 
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perceived as a fairly stable quality of an offender and the contempt it generates 
can be stable as well. While the action tendencies of anger are based on an 
appraisal of an immoral action and directed toward retribution, the action 
tendencies of contempt are based on considerations of the offender and on what 
the offender may or may not do in the future. The offender needs to be prevented 
from committing the offense again and one way to counteract the offender’s 
incompetence and tendencies to commit moral violations is to provide an 
environmental deterrent to the action. Individual deterrence may also be served by 
issuing a longer sentence to the offender and beyond that afforded by the goal of 
retribution. Contempt for an offender may reduce concern with restricting a 
punishment to a level of proportionality. 
Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice 
The goal of rehabilitation is to change the offender by requiring the 
offender’s participation in treatment programs (McFatter, 1982). The goal of 
rehabilitation is not only to prevent the offender from reoffending when returned 
to society but also to enable the offender to lead a productive life and contribute 
to society. The objectives of rehabilitation are in line with the community 
psychology values of prevention, health promotion, and individual wellness 
(Dalton et al., 2007; Jason & Glenwick, 2002). Rehabilitation can include 
substance use counseling, education, and job training. An assumption of 
rehabilitation is that people are not permanently criminal but can change if public 
resources are invested in programs for improving the offender. Participation in 
rehabilitation programs has been found to be associated with reduced recidivism 
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(Coulter & VandeWeerd, 2009; Jason et al., 2008; Liau et al., 2004; Seave, 2011; 
Van Stelle et al., 1994). 
Restorative justice combines some of the aims of the previous goals of 
punishment but does so by a different approach. The goal of restorative justice is 
to restore the harm done by the wrongdoing, similar to retribution, and to improve 
the social and moral functioning of the offender, similar to rehabilitation (Gromet 
& Darley, 2009). To achieve the goals of restorative justice, those affected by the 
crime (the offender, victim, and perhaps members of the surrounding community) 
meet to discuss the wrongdoing and the personal and interpersonal damage that 
occurred by the crime. Restorative justice goals are based on the view that a crime 
creates a “social conflict” between parties (De Keijser et al., 2002). The goal of 
restorative justice is then conflict resolution to repair the sociomoral affront and 
direct harm to the victim. The parties determine a sanction for the offender aimed 
to restore the victim, materially and psychologically, and to enable the offender to 
reintegrate into the social and moral fold of the surrounding community 
(Marshall, 2003). 
Restorative justice provides a unique orientation to punishment and is 
more in line with community psychology values. The approach allows for citizen 
participation by creating a process for victims, offenders, and community 
members to speak and have their views incorporated into how the crime is 
understood and addressed (Dalton et al., 2007). A specific aim of restorative 
justice is also to assist in developing and restoring a psychological sense of 
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community between those involved in and affected by the crime (Chavis & 
Wandersman, 1990; McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Sarason, 1974). 
It is predicted that sympathy will be the emotion most strongly associated 
with rehabilitation and restorative justice goals. Sympathy, like contempt, may be 
elicited by an appraisal of moral incompetence. The moral incompetence of an 
offender is the somewhat stable lack of capacity for moral behavior. Contempt 
may occur when the offender’s incompetence is thought to be due to the absence 
of moral mechanisms within the offender and may therefore lead to engaging the 
offender’s rational cost-benefit thought processes and applying the methods of 
individual deterrence to prevent future criminal acts. Sympathy, on the other 
hand, may occur when the offender’s moral mechanisms are perceived as 
changeable and could improve should environmental factors be oriented toward 
achieving that outcome. While contempt includes a downward judgment and 
psychological separation between the observer and elicitor, sympathy consists of 
a psychological connection. 
Sympathy has been found to predict helping and prosocial tendencies 
(Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2008; Rudolph et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2011). The 
goal of rehabilitation is to help the offender lead a law-abiding and productive life 
by providing the offender with beneficial programs, and one goal of restorative 
justice is to facilitate the offender’s reintegration into the local community. Both 
punishment goals rest on the belief that the offender’s crime does not reflect a 
permanent aspect of the criminal and that the offender remains an accepted 
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member of the surrounding moral order. Prior research has found sympathy to 
predict rehabilitation (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner et al., 1997). 
Incapacitation 
The punishment goal of incapacitation is to forcibly restrict the behaviors 
of an offender so the offender cannot commit the same offense again. An example 
is physical confinement within jails or prisons. The perspective behind 
incapacitation is that the cause of the crime exists within the offender and the 
offender will commit a similar offense if given the opportunity (Carlsmith, 2006). 
The phrase “lock ‘em up and throw away the key” encapsulates the goal of 
incapacitation. 
It is predicted that disgust will be the emotion most strongly associated 
with the goal of incapacitation. Disgust’s action tendencies are to avoid, expel, or 
quarantine potential contaminates to the self or one’s ecology. An offender with 
an immoral nature can be a repugnant threat to a group’s identity and esteem and 
it may be desirable for that person to be removed from the group’s social 
collective. The goal of incapacitation may therefore be in line with the action 
tendencies of disgust. 
In summary, the punishments issued to criminal offenders are not based on 
a single objective and the desired objectives held by the public are not without 
their psychological precursors. The goals of punishment within the criminal 
justice system are akin to the action tendencies in the public when moral 
violations are perceived and emotions are experienced. This paper will investigate 
how crime leads to punishment by considering how appraisals of moral violations 
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lead to appraisals of the offender, how appraisals of the offender lead to emotional 
responses, and how emotions predict goals of punishment. 
Rationale 
 Punishments are issued in response to criminal behaviors to achieve a 
variety of objectives. The different goals of punishment can lead to different types 
of sanctions which can have positive or negative consequences for offender 
wellbeing as well as recidivism rates. The factors that determine which objectives 
are pursued are predominantly unknown. This paper used recent developments in 
moral psychology and in functionalist accounts of emotion to establish how 
crimes lead to the goals of punishment desired by the general public. 
 The human experience of morality includes judgments of right and wrong 
behavior that apply universally. Moral codes are important for protecting and 
promoting individual human welfare and well-functioning social groups. Moral 
codes are sustained by innate moral mechanisms operating alongside socially 
crafted moral orders. Over time, social institutions can be developed to embody 
and implement the moral views and desires of the group. For moral violations that 
are inadequately or inappropriately responded to by informal social processes, 
criminal justice systems have been established to address the moral violations 
committed by persons within the boundaries of the group. 
 The domain of moral concern rests on five moral foundations. The 
foundations relate to individual harm, fairness, ingroup loyalty, social hierarchies, 
and human purity and sanctity. This paper proposes that responding to a crime 
with a specific goal of punishment begins with an appraisal of which moral 
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foundation is violated. Following appraisals that a particular moral violation has 
occurred, secondary appraisals of the offender occur and include determining the 
degree to which the offender committed an immoral act, the degree to which the 
offender is morally incompetent, and the degree to which the offender exhibits an 
immoral nature. 
 Following secondary appraisals of the offender, a third-party observer will 
experience any of a variety of emotions including anger, contempt, disgust, 
sympathy, or fear. Each emotion provides the lay-judge with an action tendency 
for responding to the initial moral violation. The action tendencies resonating in 
the general public are interwoven with the goals of punishment pursued by the 
public’s criminal justice system. This paper tested the relations between the 
appraisals of moral violations, the secondary appraisals of the offender, the 
emotions elicited, and the desired punishment goals. Such a model that draws 
from moral psychology and functional accounts of emotion has not been 
developed for understanding how crimes lead to goals of punishment. 
 A pilot study was conducted first to test the validity of the survey items 
that were used in the main study. The main study was then conducted to test the 
hypothesized path model using a path analysis. In both the pilot study and the 
main study, participants were members of the general public who used a web-
based marketplace designed for completing tasks online. In the main study, 
participants were presented with one of four crime scenarios and then responded 
to items measuring their appraisals, emotions, and desired punishment goals. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
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 The proposed path model (Figure 3) will fit the sample data in a path 
analysis, and all predicted paths will be significant and in the predicted direction. 
Violations of harm and fairness moral codes will predict the appraisal of an 
immoral act. Violations of ingroup and authority moral codes will predict the 
appraisal of moral incompetence. Violations of purity moral codes will predict the 
appraisal of an immoral nature. The appraisal of an immoral act will predict anger 
and fear. The appraisal of moral incompetence will predict contempt and 
sympathy. The appraisal of an immoral nature will predict sympathy and disgust. 
Anger will predict retribution. Fear will predict general deterrence. Contempt will 
predict individual deterrence. Sympathy will predict rehabilitation and restorative 
justice. Disgust will predict incapacitation. All relations will be positive except 
the relation between an immoral nature and sympathy, which will be negative. 
Pilot Study 
Overview 
 A survey was used in the main study to test the hypothesis. The survey 
included four scales to measure the four sets of variables: the moral foundations, 
secondary appraisals, emotions, and punishment goals. The items used in each 
scale were created by the author. Before conducting the main study, a pilot study 
was conducted to test the validity of the survey items. The pilot study consisted of 
four matching tasks, one for each set of variables. Survey items that were not 
sufficiently matched with the variable they were intended to measure were 
removed from the main study. A separate group of participants was recruited for 
each matching task. 
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Method 
Participants and procedure.  Participants were recruited through 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a web site people can go to and 
complete tasks for payment. MTurk is increasingly being used for research and, 
along with other web-based mediums, has been validated as a tool for recruiting 
participants and conducting survey research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Jasmin & Casasanto, 2012; 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Schnoebelen & Kuperman, 2010). 
 Participants of web-based studies are self-selected and generally complete 
the study because of internal motivations such as enjoyment (Buhrmester et al., 
2011). Self-selected volunteers have been found to provide more complete 
responses than solicited participants such as undergraduate students (Pettit, 2002; 
Walsh, Kiesler, Sproull, & Hesse, 1992). Furthermore, participants engage in less 
social desirability when responding to web-based questionnaires than when 
completing paper-and-pencil questionnaires (Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, & 
Drasgow, 1999). 
 Four matching tasks were developed, one for each scale. For each 
matching task, participants were given a description of each variable that was a 
part of the scale. Below the list of variable descriptions appeared the survey items 
for the scale. Participants were instructed to match the content of each survey item 
with one of the variable descriptions. Participants could also respond that the 
survey item did not match any of the descriptions. The survey items were 
presented in random order. 
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 Participants were presented with the following preliminary instructions: 
 We are interested in studying moral violations, perceptions of 
criminal offenders, emotions, and punishment goals of the criminal justice 
system. Before we begin the studies, we need to see if we have good 
survey items. In this preliminary study, you will be asked to read the 
descriptions of some variables and then to match the descriptions with 
individual survey items. 
Participants were compensated for completing a matching task. 
Compensation was based on the amount of time it was anticipated to complete the 
task. Participants were compensated $0.05 for completing the emotion task, $0.10 
for completing the secondary appraisals task, and $0.15 for completing the moral 
foundations and punishment goals tasks. The effects of compensation on survey 
completion have been investigated in prior research. Although the amount of 
compensation has been found to impact response rate, it has not been found to 
influence data quality (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 
2013). 
 Pilot study data were screened for quality based on two criteria. First, 
participants who selected the same construct description for all the survey items 
would be removed from future analyses. Removing participants for selecting the 
same response option across all items has been recommended in reviews of 
MTurk sampling (Crump et al., 2013). Second, participants who completed the 
study in less than one minute would also be removed. Based on the two criteria, 
no participants were removed from the datasets.  
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 The purpose of the pilot study was to test whether the survey items 
reflected the meaning of the variable they were designed to measure. Therefore, 
survey items that were matched with the intended variable description by at least 
65% of a matching task’s sample were retained for use in the main study. The 
65% criterion allowed each variable to be represented by a diverse set of items but 
also required that a majority of participants recognized a connection between a 
variable and the items that would be used to measure it. 
The goal was to develop at least five items for each moral foundation, 
secondary appraisal, and punishment goal. For each emotion, the goal was to 
develop three items. Emotions have been measured using three items, and 
sometimes two items, in previous research (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Each matching 
task was therefore repeated, using new items, until a sufficient number of items 
met the retention criterion for each variable. One matching task iteration was 
required for the moral foundations, secondary appraisals, and punishment goals. 
Two matching task iterations were required to generate the emotions items. 
 A single matching task iteration was required to test the moral foundations 
items. Thirty-four participants completed the task. Participants were 62% female, 
85% White, 6% Asian American, 6% Black, and had a mean age of 36.39 years 
(SD = 11.31). 
 A single matching task was conducted for the secondary appraisals items. 
Thirty-three participants completed the task. The sample was 58% female, 82% 
White, 6% Black, 6% Latino/a, and had a mean age of 36.45 years (SD = 11.23). 
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 Two matching task iterations were conducted to develop the emotions 
items. Forty-two participants completed the first iteration. Participants were 57% 
female, 74% White, 12% Black, 10% Asian American, and had a mean age of 
33.36 years (SD = 10.69). The second iteration consisted of 30 participants. The 
sample was 53% female, 77% White, 10% Black, 7% multiracial, and had a mean 
age of 29.10 years (SD = 11.09). 
 A single matching task was conducted for the punishment goals items. 
Thirty-two participants completed the task. Participants were 63% female, 87% 
White, 13% Black, and had a mean age of 36.84 years (SD = 15.81). 
Materials. 
Moral foundations.  Thirty-one items were created to measure whether a 
crime violated the five moral foundations. Each moral foundation was represented 
by six or seven items. The variable descriptions and survey items for the moral 
foundations were developed using prior research (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012; Rozin et al. 1999; Shweder et al., 1997). 
A sample variable description is “Harm: A person commits a moral violation if 
they harm another individual. Examples include hurting someone physically or 
emotionally.” A sample item for the harm foundation is “The offender’s actions 
caused direct harm to other individuals.”  The instructions, variable descriptions, 
and items for the matching task are presented in Appendix A.  
Secondary appraisals.  Eighteen items were developed to measure the 
secondary appraisals. Each appraisal was represented by five to seven items. A 
sample variable description is “Immoral act: The act committed by the offender is 
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a moral violation.” A sample item for the appraisal of an immoral act is “The act 
committed by the offender is wrong.”  The instructions, variable descriptions, and 
items for the matching task are presented in Appendix B. 
Emotions.  In the first iteration of the emotions matching task, three items 
were used for each emotion, making 15 items in total. For example, the items for 
anger were “Anger,” “Furious,” and “Outrage.” The instructions and emotion 
items are presented in Appendix C.  
In the second iteration of the emotions matching task, five new items were 
used for contempt. Also, the items “Anger,” “Fear,” “Sympathy,” and “Disgust” 
were removed in order to shorten the matching task. The second iteration 
contained 13 items (see Table 4). 
Punishment goals.  Forty-three items were created to measure the six 
punishment goals. Each punishment goal was represented by six to nine items. 
The variable descriptions and survey items were based on prior research (e.g., 
Carlsmith, 2008; De Keijser et al., 2002; Gromet & Darley, 2009; McFatter, 
1982; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). A sample variable description is “Retribution: The 
sentence should penalize the offender in accordance with what he or she deserves 
for having committed the crime. The punishment to the offender should be equal 
to the wrongfulness of the crime. When retribution is achieved, the offender has 
“paid the debt owed to society.” A sample item for retribution is “The sentence 
should punish the offender for having committed a crime.” The instructions, 
variable descriptions, and items for the matching task are presented in Appendix 
D. 
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Results and Discussion 
Moral foundations items.  The survey items that were matched with the 
correct variable description by at least 65% of the participants were retained for 
the main study. One item from the fairness scale and one item from the authority 
scale did not meet this criterion and were removed (see Table 1). At least five 
items met the criterion for each foundation. 
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Table 1 
Percent Frequency Distribution for Moral Foundations Matching Task 
Item # Harm Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity None 
Harm       
 1 91  3 6   
 2 88 3 3 3 3  
 3 91  3 3 3  
 4 79 6 6  3 6 
 5 82  3 9 6  
 6 91 6  3   
Fairness       
 1  100     
 2  91  9   
 3 3 85 6 6   
 4 3 82 3 3 6 3 
 5  76 9 6 9  
 - 6 35 23 6 18 12 6 
Ingroup       
 1 3 6 88 3   
 2  6 91 3   
 3  6 85 6 3  
 4  20 68 12   
 5  3 91 3 3  
 6  6 85 9   
Authority       
 1  6 12 70 12  
 - 2 3 3 71 23   
 3 3 3 3 88 3  
 4  6 6 85 3  
 5   29 65 6  
 6  6 3 65 20 6 
Purity       
 1  6 3 3 79 9 
 2 3 3 3 6 85  
 3 3  3 6 82 6 
 4  3  3 85 9 
 5   3 15 67 15 
 6 3 6 6 3 70 12 
 7   6 6 88  
 
Note.  Item numbers correspond to the item numbers in Appendix A. “-” beside an 
item number indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for retention. 
N = 34. 
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Secondary appraisals items.  All the items from the secondary appraisals 
scales met the retention criterion (see Table 2). At least five items were retained 
for each scale. 
Table 2 
Percent Frequency Distribution for Secondary Appraisals Matching Task 
Item # Immoral Act 
Moral 
Incomp. 
Immoral 
Nature None 
Immoral Act     
 1 81 13 3 3 
 2 85 12 3  
 3 97 3   
 4 88  3 9 
 5 85 3 6 6 
Moral 
Incompetence     
 1  97 3  
 2  88 12  
 3 6 85 9  
 4 3 72 22 3 
 5  100   
 6 3 97   
 7  97 3  
Immoral 
Nature     
 1 9 6 76 9 
 2  3 97  
 3 3 3 88 6 
 4  6 94  
 5  3 97  
 6  6 94  
 
Note.  Item numbers correspond to the item numbers in Appendix B. 
N = 33. 
Emotions items.  All the items for the emotions of anger, fear, sympathy, 
and disgust met the retention criterion (see Table 3). Three items were retained for 
each of these emotions. Unfortunately, only one item met the retention criterion 
for contempt. Therefore, a second matching task was conducted that contained 
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five new items for contempt. However, none of the new items met the retention 
criterion (see Table 4). Therefore, a new criterion for retaining items was applied. 
Items that were matched with contempt by at least 50% of the sample were 
retained for use in the main study. The new criterion led to five items being 
retained: “Contempt,” “Disdain,” and “Scornful” from the first iteration, and 
“Disrespect” and “Condescension” from the second iteration. Each of these items 
was moderately associated with contempt and weakly associated with the other 
emotions. 
Table 3 
Percent Frequency Distribution for Emotions Matching Task: First Iteration 
Item Anger Fear Contempt Sympathy Disgust None 
Anger       
 Anger 94 2 2  2  
 Furious 95  5    
 Outrage 88  8 2 2  
Fear       
 Fear  94 2 2 2  
 Afraid 2 93   5  
 Frightened  93 5  2  
Contempt       
 Contempt 5 5 78  12  
 -  Disdain 2 5 53 2 33 5 
 - Scornful 29  50 2 12 7 
Sympathy       
 Sympathy   5 93 2  
 Compassion  2 2 89 2 5 
 Pity  2 5 74 12 7 
Disgust       
 Disgust 2  7 5 86  
 Revulsion 2 2 2 2 84 8 
 Sickened  2 5 2 89 2 
 
Note.  “-” beside an item indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for 
retention. 
N = 42. 
75 
 
 
Table 4 
Percent Frequency Distribution for Emotions Matching Task: Second Iteration 
Item Anger Fear Contempt Sympathy Disgust None 
Anger       
 Furious 100      
 Outrage 97    3  
Fear       
 Afraid  100     
 Frightened 3 94    3 
Contempt       
 - Disgrace   30  60 10 
 - Despise 17  30  50 3 
 - Disrespect 10  52  7 31 
 - Condescension   54 3 10 33 
 - Disregard   45  3 52 
Sympathy       
 Compassion    90  10 
  Pity   13 67 7 13 
Disgust       
 Revulsion 7  3  87 3 
 Sickened   7 3 90  
 
Note.  “-” beside an item indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for 
retention. 
N = 30. 
Punishment goals items.  Seven punishment goals items did not meet the 
retention criterion and were removed (see Table 5). At least five items met the 
criterion for each punishment goal. 
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Table 5 
Percent Frequency Distribution for Punishment Goals Matching Task 
Item # Ret Gen Det Ind Det Rehab Rest Inc None 
Retribution        
 1 69 9 16 3   3 
 2 91 6 3     
 3 72 9 3 3 13   
 4 85 3 3 6   3 
 5 66 6 3 3  3 19 
 6 75 7 9    9 
 - 7 59 3 16 3 3 3 13 
 8 82 9     9 
 - 9 53   6 31  10 
General 
Deterrence        
 1  88  6 6   
 2  85 9   6  
 3  94 6     
 4  85 3 6 3  3 
 5  97    3  
 6  88 3 3 3 3  
Individual 
Deterrence        
 1  6 91   3  
 2  6 88 3  3  
 3 6 3 85  3 3  
 - 4 6 6 50 3  6 29 
 5 3 10 78 3  3 3 
 6  3 91 3  3  
Rehabilitation        
 1  3  91 6   
 2  3  91 6   
 3    97 3   
 4    100    
 5  3  88 6 3  
 6  6 3 91    
Restorative        
 1   3 3 91  3 
 - 2  3 6 13 59  19 
 3 3 6 3 19 69   
 4 3 3 3 16 66  9 
 5  3 3  94   
 6  3  9 85 3  
 - 7   3 29 48  20 
 8   6  91  3 
 - 9 16  3 6 56 3 16 
Incapacitation        
 1  3 6   91  
 2   6 3 3 88  
 3   6  3 88 3 
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 4   6   94  
 5    3 6 91  
 6  3 6   91  
 - 7 6 3   6 60 25 
 
Note.  Item numbers correspond to the item numbers in Appendix D. “-” beside an 
item number indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for retention. 
N = 32. 
Main Study 
Overview 
 The hypothesized path model was tested in the main study. To measure 
participant reactions to crime, participants were first asked to read a short crime 
scenario. Participants then completed the four scales that were developed in the 
pilot study. Factor analyses were conducted for the items of each scale. The factor 
analyses were conducted to remove items that did not load on the intended factor. 
However, if the items of two constructs loaded on the same factor, the constructs 
were not combined. This was done so that the hypothesized path model could be 
tested in its original form (this was the case for general deterrence and individual 
deterrence). The path model was then tested by a path analysis. 
 Additional analyses were also conducted. The first additional analysis was 
a test of the path model while controlling for crime severity. A measure of crime 
severity was therefore included in the survey. The second additional analysis was 
to modify the model in order to achieve fit with the data. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were recruited through MTurk, and were 
compensated $0.50 for completing the study. The original number of participants 
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was 664. Participants were first screened by whether they completed the study. 
The study included 19 subscales, one for each variable in the path model. 
Participants who did not complete at least 70% of the items for each subscale 
were removed. Seventy-nine participants were removed based on this criterion. 
Participant responses were then assessed by whether the same response was given 
for all the items within any of the four variables sets. No participants were 
removed based on this assessment. Participants were also screened by whether 
they gave an unlikely response to either of two questions. Along with the scales 
for the current study, participants completed a survey unrelated to the current 
study. The survey was the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et 
al., 2011). The MFQ measures people’s moral outlooks and includes two items 
that are used to screen participants. One item is “Whether or not someone was 
good at math.” If participants reported that this consideration is “somewhat 
relevant,” “very relevant,” or “extremely relevant” to their moral outlook then 
they were removed from the sample. The second item is “It is better to do good 
than to do bad.” Participants who reported that they disagreed with this statement 
were also removed. Thirty-six participants were removed based on their responses 
to these two items.  
Finally, participants were screened by how quickly they completed the 
study. Although people will naturally vary in how long they take to complete a 
study, some participants may have moved through the study too quickly to 
provide valid responses to the survey items. Participants were removed for time 
based on a commonly used statistical criterion: those who were outside a 95% 
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confidence interval around the mean completion time, and who were on the low 
end of the time distribution, were considered to have completion times 
significantly different from the mean time. These participants were removed for 
completing the study unusually fast. A 95% confidence interval is determined by 
calculating the mean and standard deviation of the distribution. Before calculating 
the mean and standard deviation, participants who took a relatively long time, and 
were separated by neighboring times by over a minute, were removed temporarily 
(8 cases were removed, times were 33.33 minutes and longer). The mean and 
standard deviation were then calculated (M = 15.30, SD = 4.94). Also, the time 
distribution was determined to be close to normal based on a visual inspection (a 
method recommended by Field, 2005, for samples with more than 200 
participants). Using a z-score of -1.96, the 95% confidence interval was 
demarcated at the low end at 5.62 minutes. Three participants completed the study 
in less time and were removed (a full 2.5% of the participants was not removed 
because participant times were more densely distributed at the low end than at the 
high end of the distribution). In total, 18% of the original sample was removed, 
leaving 546 participants. 
The necessary number of participants to conduct a path analysis is 
estimated by the number of free parameters in the model (Kline, 2005). The 
number of free parameters in the hypothesized path model includes 17 path 
coefficients, 5 exogenous variable variances, 10 exogenous variable covariances, 
and 14 endogenous variable disturbances. The total number of free parameters is 
46. While 20 participants per parameter is sometimes recommended, 10 
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participants has also been suggested as being sufficient with five participants 
being the minimum number (Kline, 2005). To have 10 participants per parameter, 
the current study would require 460 participants. Furthermore, a sample size of 
400 has been recommended for models containing only measured variables and 
no latent variables (Y. Li, personal communication, February 5, 2012). The 
number of participants in the current study was therefore determined to be 
sufficient to test the study’s hypothesis. 
The sample was 56% female and had a mean age of 34.59 years (SD = 
12.70). The sample was 83% White, 7% Black, 3% Asian American, 2% Latino/a, 
1% Native American, and 4% of another race or multiracial. The composition of 
political affiliations was 35% Democrat, 26% Independent, 17% Republican, 5% 
Libertarian, 1% Green Party, 1% had another affiliation and 15% reported having 
no affiliation. A full account of the sample’s demographic characteristics is 
presented in Appendix E. 
Procedure.  Participants completed the study using a computer of their 
choosing. The study materials were presented to participants by the online survey 
program Qualtrics. The following instructions were presented to participants at 
the start of the study: 
We are interested in the opinions and judgments people 
have about different crimes. In this study, you will read a 
description of an event that could result in criminal charges in 
some jurisdictions. Following the description are questions asking 
about your views of the event. We are interested in your reactions, 
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not in how you think judges, police officers, or others might view 
or respond to the event. Please respond to the questions with your 
first, natural response. 
Participants were then presented with a description of a crime that was 
randomly selected from a set of four crime descriptions. Participants then 
completed the four scales from the pilot study and a crime severity scale. 
Participants were presented with one scale at a time, and the scales were presented 
in random order. The items within each scale were also randomized. After 
completing the five scales, participants completed a demographics survey. 
Materials. 
Crime descriptions.  Four crime scenarios were written by the author. 
Previous studies have also used four crime scenarios to study reactions to crime 
(Carlsmith, 2008; McFatter, 1982). The scenarios used in this study represented a 
cross section of crime and ranged in type and severity. The scenarios were the 
following: “A convenience store knowingly sells alcohol to minors;” “A person 
makes counterfeit $20 bills and uses them to buy things;” “A homeless person 
mugs a nurse;” and “A protester pushes a police officer during an illegal protest 
against the country’s involvement in a war.” 
 Moral foundations.  The Moral Foundations scale measured the degree to 
which participants thought a crime violated the five moral foundations. A sample 
item for the violation of harm is “The offender’s actions caused direct harm to 
other individuals.” Responses were provided on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 
(Not at all) to 9 (Extremely). Five to seven items formed each moral foundation 
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subscale. Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .93 (harm), .91 (fairness), .86 
(ingroup), .86 (authority), and .88 (purity). See Appendix F for the scale’s 
instructions and an illustration of a scale item. 
Secondary appraisals.  The Secondary Appraisals scale measured the 
degree to which participants thought the offender committed an immoral act, was 
morally incompetent, and had an immoral nature. An example item for the 
appraisal of an immoral act is “The act committed by the offender is wrong.” 
Responses were provided on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 
9 (Strongly agree). Five to seven items formed each subscale. Cronbach’s alphas 
for the subscales were .92 (immoral act), .92 (moral incompetence), and .89 
(immoral nature). 
Emotions.  Participants rated the degree to which they felt anger, 
contempt, disgust, sympathy, and fear “when thinking about the offender and the 
offender’s actions”. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (Do not 
feel this at all) to 9 (Feel this very strongly). Three to five items formed each 
subscale. Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .93 (anger), .95 (fear), .87 
(contempt), .88 (sympathy), and .90 (disgust). 
Punishment goals.  Participants rated the extent to which they thought 
retribution, general deterrence, individual deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative 
justice, and incapacitation should be important considerations when sentencing 
the offender. Ratings were provided using a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at 
all important) to 9 (Extremely important). Five to six items formed each subscale. 
Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .83 (retribution), .95 (general 
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deterrence), .93 (individual deterrence), .88 (rehabilitation), .77 (restorative), and 
.96 (incapacitation). 
Crime severity.  The Crime Severity scale consisted of one item. 
Participants were asked, “How serious is this crime?” Responses were provided 
on a scale from 1 (Not serious at all) to 9 (Extremely serious). 
Demographics.  A demographics survey asked participants for 
information regarding their gender, age, race/ethnicity, political affiliation, 
religious affiliation, education, and income. The full survey is provided in 
Appendix G. 
Results and Discussion 
 Factor analyses and internal reliability analyses were first conducted to 
improve the psychometric properties of the subscales. Path analyses were then 
conducted to test the hypothesis and to fit the path model to the data. 
Item analysis and scale reduction.  An exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted for each of the four scales: moral foundations, secondary appraisals, 
emotions, and punishment goals. Factor extraction was conducted by using 
Principal Axis Factoring along with the eigenvalue > 1 criterion. Factor rotation 
was done using Direct Oblimin rotation. Individual survey items were retained if 
they a) had factor loadings greater than .30 on the factor they were designed to 
measure and b) had their highest loading on the factor they were designed to 
measure. 
Moral foundations.  Factor extraction produced five factors. The five 
factors accounted for 71% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are 
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presented in Appendix H. Based on the item removal criteria, one item was 
removed from the fairness subscale and three items were removed from the purity 
subscale. Internal reliability analyses showed that all the subscales had adequate 
internal reliability and that the reliabilities would not be substantially improved if 
additional items were removed. Four to six items were retained for each moral 
foundation subscale. Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .93 (harm), .90 
(fairness), .86 (ingroup), .86 (authority), and .86 (purity). 
Secondary appraisals.  Factor extraction produced three factors, which 
accounted for 71% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are 
presented in Appendix I. Based on the item removal criteria, one item was 
removed from the immoral nature subscale. Internal reliability analyses showed 
that no additional items should be removed. Five to seven items were retained for 
each subscale. Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .92 (immoral act), .92 
(moral incompetence), and .87 (immoral nature). 
Emotions.  Factor extraction produced three factors. The three factors 
accounted for 74% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are 
presented in Appendix J. The items for the fear and sympathy subscales loaded on 
distinct factors. However, the items for anger, contempt, and disgust loaded on a 
single factor. Research on emotions (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007) and 
data from the pilot study indicate these three emotions are distinguishable, 
particularly anger and disgust. A second factor analysis was therefore conducted 
with just the items from these three subscales. For the second analysis, the 
number of factors was fixed at three. Factor loadings are presented in Appendix J. 
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The items for each emotion loaded on a distinct factor, and none of the items were 
removed based on the item removal criteria. Internal reliability analyses also 
showed that no items should be removed. Three to five items were retained for 
each subscale. Cronbach’s alphas for the subscales were .93 (anger), .95 (fear), 
.87 (contempt), .88 (sympathy), and .90 (disgust). 
Punishment goals.  Factor extraction of the punishment goals items 
produced five factors. The five factors accounted for 71% of the variance. Factor 
loadings after factor rotation are presented in Appendix K. The items from the 
retribution subscale loaded on three factors. One item had a high factor loading on 
the “deterrence” factor. After reviewing this item, it was determined that the item 
was not very specific in terms of punishment goals. The item was therefore 
removed from the subscale. The remaining items were retained because they were 
conceptually consistent with retribution and because they were matched with 
retribution in the pilot study. Furthermore, no additional items needed to be 
removed based on an internal reliability analysis. 
The items from the general deterrence and individual deterrence subscales 
loaded on the same factor. A second factor analysis with only these items, and 
with the number of factors fixed at two, did not differentiate the items. However, 
since the two punishment goals have been distinguished in prior research (Oswald 
et al., 2002), and since the items were differentiated in the pilot study, the two 
deterrence goals were kept separate for the current study. Also, no items were 
removed from these subscales based on the factor analysis. 
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 One item was removed from the rehabilitation subscale and one from the 
restorative justice subscale. A second item on the restorative justice subscale met 
the item removal criteria although marginally. After review of the item, it was 
determined that the item was conceptually in line with the goal of restoration and 
the item was retained. No items from the incapacitation subscale were removed. 
Internal reliability analyses of the scales showed that no additional items 
should be removed. Five to six items were retained for each subscale. Cronbach’s 
alphas for the subscales were .80 (retribution), .95 (general deterrence), .93 
(individual deterrence), .91 (rehabilitation), .71 (restorative), and .96 
(incapacitation). 
Descriptive statistics.  Subscale scores were determined by calculating 
the mean of the item scores. A subscale score was calculated if at least 70% of the 
subscale’s items held a value. The means, standard deviations, and correlation 
coefficients for all variables are presented in Table 6.  
The means and standard deviations for the individual crimes are presented 
in Appendix L. Each crime was perceived as violating each of the moral 
foundations. Each secondary appraisal, each emotion, and support for each 
punishment goal also occurred for each individual crime. This study amalgamated 
the reactions to the four crimes in order to study reactions to crime in general. 
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Table 6 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Harm 4.87 (2.35) -                   
2. Fairness 5.56 (2.78) .44* -                  
3. Ingroup 5.28 (1.99) .35* .58* -                 
4. Authority 6.44 (1.82) .47* .44* .69* -                
5. Purity 4.86 (2.22) .62* .57* .58* .64* -               
6. Immoral act 6.29 (2.12) .47* .64* .58* .68* .68* -              
7. Moral incompetence 4.01 (2.06) .33* .28* .41* .40* .49* .49* -             
8. Immoral nature 2.98 (1.70) .44* .42* .44* .44* .61* .55* .64* -            
9. Anger 3.93 (2.43) .45* .33* .41* .47* .54* .53* .48* .60* -           
10. Fear 2.22 (1.84) .38* .19* .25* .23* .34* .22* .32* .41* .47* -          
11. Contempt 4.03 (2.10) .33* .38* .49* .52* .51* .54* .48* .56* .76* .35* -         
12. Sympathy 3.13 (2.09) .25* .08 -.11* -.15* .03 -.13* -.10* -.06 -.08 .21* -.18* -        
13. Disgust 3.52 (2.34) .49* .37* .45* .48* .64* .53* .52* .65* .83* .49* .76* -.04 -       
14. Retribution 5.64 (1.66) .28* .41* .41* .44* .40* .45* .33* .44* .40* .12* .39* -.15* .41* -      
15. General deterrence 6.13 (2.21) .29* .38* .47* .57* .44* .52* .39* .43* .48* .17* .46* -.27* .48* .67* -     
16. Individual deterrence 6.55 (2.04) .32* .47* .52* .61* .50* .59* .37* .44* .48* .17* .48* -.26* .47* .71* .89* -    
17. Rehabilitation 5.84 (2.31) .31* .35* .21* .22* .24* .26* .15* .06 .11* .20* .07 .25* .08 .18* .11* .19* -   
18. Restorative 5.49 (1.72) .13* .11* .07 .10* .07 .03 .02 -.05 -.04 .07 -.04 .31* -.07 .10 -.06 -.03 .55* -  
19. Incapacitation 3.80 (2.30) .42* .48* .43* .41* .49* .47* .43* .60* .50* .31* .43* -.08 .52* .61* .58* .59* .20* -.02 - 
20. Crime severity 5.31 (2.22) .40* .56* .49* .54* .55* .66* .41* .49* .54* .27* .50* -.15* .55* .41* .54* .58* .22* -.01 .54* 
 
Note:  All subscales range from 1 to 9. 
*p < .05. 
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Test of the hypothesis.  The hypothesis was tested using path analysis 
and the software program AMOS (version 18; Byrne, 2001). A number of fit 
indices were used to assess model fit. A common and basic fit index is the chi-
square value (χ2). As the fit of a model worsens, the value of chi-square increases. 
A significant chi-square value, at p < .05, indicates poor fit. However, the chi-
square statistic is typically significant when tests are conducted with large 
samples (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980). An alternative use of the chi-square value, 
which minimizes the impact of sample size, is to calculate the relative, or normed, 
chi-square (χ2/df; Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977). When using the 
relative chi-square statistic, a recommended standard for determining adequate fit 
is χ2/df < 5.0 (Wheaton et al., 1977). Along with the relative chi-square statistic, 
the following fit indices and standards were used: comparative fit index (CFI) > 
.09, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) < .10, and standardized 
root mean square residual (SRMR) < .10 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005). Based on these criteria, the hypothesized model did 
not have adequate fit: χ²(144) = 3974.09, p < .001, χ2/df = 27.60, CFI = .45, 
RMSEA = .22, SRMR = .28. 
The path coefficients from the path analysis are presented in Figure 4. 
Although the model did not fit the data, 15 of the 17 hypothesized paths were 
significant and in the anticipated direction. The predicted relation between 
immoral nature and sympathy was not significant. Also, the relation between 
moral incompetence and sympathy was significant but was negative rather than 
positive. 
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An attempt was made to improve the fit of the model while holding to the 
predicted paths of the hypothesis. The approach that was used was to correlate 
error terms. 
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Figure 4.  Path analysis of the hypothesized path model. Standardized path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant 
paths at p < .05. 
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Correlating error terms.  An error term, also called a residual, represents 
the variance of a variable that is not explained by the model. Unexplained 
variance can be caused by constructs not represented in the model as well as 
measurement error (Lleras, 2005). The unexplained variances of two variables in 
a model could be due to the same unrepresented variable and would therefore be 
related. Correlating error terms can therefore improve the fit of a model without 
introducing new variables that are not part of the research question. Furthermore, 
if correlated error terms only occur between variables that do not have a direct 
path between them, called a bow-free pattern, the model can be analyzed as a 
recursive model and would not require the more sophisticated methods for 
analyzing nonrecursive models (Kline, 2005). To prevent bow patterns from 
occurring, only the error terms of variables within the same variable set were 
considered. Other considerations included a correlation’s modification index and 
a theoretical rationale. A modification index represents the expected drop in chi-
square if a model parameter, such as an error correlation, is allowed to be 
estimated in a subsequent path analysis (Byrne, 2001). 
The modification indices (MI) from the path analysis of the hypothesized 
model suggested the error terms of the following variables should be correlated: 
moral incompetence and immoral nature (MI = 102.34), anger and contempt (MI 
= 132.57), anger and disgust (MI = 164.72), contempt and disgust (MI = 146.65), 
retribution and general deterrence (MI = 158.36), retribution and individual 
deterrence (MI = 192.87), retribution and incapacitation (MI = 122.81), general 
deterrence and individual deterrence (MI = 317.94), general deterrence and 
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incapacitation (MI = 79.90), individual deterrence and incapacitation (MI = 
105.96), and rehabilitation and restorative justice (MI = 139.77).  
Along with a high modification index, each of these correlated errors had 
a theoretical rationale for inclusion. The appraisals of a criminal offender’s moral 
incompetence and immoral nature would likely be caused by common variables 
other than the moral violations represented in the model. The two appraisals 
would therefore have related error terms. The three emotions of anger, contempt, 
and disgust have been grouped together in an “other-condemning” family of 
emotions (Haidt, 2003). These emotional experiences would likely be related in 
the context of judging criminal behavior and their error terms would therefore be 
correlated. The punishment goals of retribution, general deterrence, individual 
deterrence, and incapacitation can be considered “punitive” goals while 
rehabilitation and restorative justice can be considered “rehabilitative” goals (Lau, 
Tyson, & Bond, 2009). The punishment goals would therefore form two 
interrelated sets of punishment goals. The interrelations of these two sets of 
punishment goals have been found in prior research (De Keijser et al., 2002).  
One additional correlation between error terms had a substantive 
modification index: anger and fear (MI = 96.28). These two emotions can be 
caused by similar variables not represented in the model. However, since the 
modification indices between the error terms of fear and contempt and between 
fear and disgust were low, it was decided that fear should not be partially 
connected to the interrelated emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust. 
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By including the correlated errors, the fit of the model was improved but 
was still not adequate: χ²(133) = 1858.11, p < .001, χ2/df = 13.97, CFI = .75, 
RMSEA = .16, SRMR = .28. All the path coefficients that were significant in the 
first path analysis remained so except for the path between fear and general 
deterrence. 
Additional analyses. 
Controlling for crime severity.  The perceived severity of a crime may 
account for many of the relations that were significant in the original path 
analysis. The severity of an act is related to emotional reactions (Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2011) and the severity of crime is related to support for punishment goals 
(Darley et al., 2000; Gromet & Darley, 2006). It is likely that the moral violations 
and the secondary appraisals would be related to crime severity as well. It is 
therefore possible that variance in crime severity could produce significant 
relationships between the variables. 
An additional path analysis was conducted to control for crime severity. 
The same correlated errors from the second analysis were also included. The fit of 
the model was improved but was still not adequate: χ²(133) = 1343.46, p < .001, 
χ2/df = 10.10, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .13, SRMR = .13. Three additional path 
coefficients became nonsignificant: the negative path coefficient between moral 
incompetence and sympathy, the path between immoral act and fear, and the path 
between contempt and individual deterrence. The path model is presented in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Path analysis of the hypothesized path model with correlated errors and controlling for crime severity. Standardized path 
coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at p < .05. 
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Fitting the model.  Two attempts were made to fit the model to the data. 
In the first attempt, paths were added to the model using modification indices 
until adequate fit was attained. In the second attempt, information from the first 
attempt was used to produce a more parsimonious model that still fit the data. The 
first attempt began with the correlated errors that were used previously but 
without crime severity as a control variable. Paths were then added sequentially 
until model fit was attained. To attain model fit, 21 new paths had to be added. 
Along with the original 17 paths of the hypothesized path model, 38 paths in total 
were necessary to fit the model: χ²(110) = 700.28, p < .001, χ2/df = 6.37, CFI = 
.92, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .13 (the CFI and RMSEA fit indexes met their 
standards for fit). 
 The second attempt to fit the model began by removing all the paths from 
the first attempt that had coefficients less than .20. Twenty-one paths remained. 
The error correlations used to test the hypothesized model were also included, and 
crime severity was added as a control. Model fit was not attained so two 
additional paths were added based on their modification indices. All fit indices, 
except the relative chi-square statistic, then indicated adequate model fit: χ²(127) 
= 677.92, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.34, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .08. The 
fitted path model is presented in Figure 6. To improve the clarity of presentation, 
the same figure, but without the error correlations and the crime severity variable, 
is presented in Figure 7. 
Fifteen of the 23 paths were either direct or indirect effects in the 
hypothesized path model. New paths were between harm and sympathy, authority 
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and immoral act, purity and moral incompetence, immoral nature and anger, 
immoral nature and fear, immoral nature and contempt, fear and rehabilitation, 
and contempt and general deterrence. All of the additional paths were positive. 
Also, the path between authority and sympathy was predicted to be positive but 
was negative. 
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Figure 6.  Path analysis of the fitted path model. Standardized path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at p 
< .05. 
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Figure 7.  Path analysis of the fitted path model. Error correlations and crime severity are removed from the diagram. Standardized 
path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at p < .05. 
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General Discussion 
A great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for 
vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only retribution can 
restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to 
punish the criminal. (Yosal Rogat; as cited in Arendt, 1963, p. 277). 
Crimes can be perceived as morally wrong for a variety of reasons. The 
moral violations that are perceived in a crime may then be related to appraisals of 
the offender which, in turn, elicit emotional reactions. Different emotions, with 
their individual action tendencies, may then be related to different ways for 
responding to the crime. Responses to crime, such as punishment goals, would 
then be geared toward addressing the eliciting moral violations and appraisals of 
the offender. 
Punishments can have a variety of effects. They can bring justice to 
victims and affirm the values of a group, but also isolate offenders and potentially 
reduce an offender’s relational and economic wellbeing. Many of the issues 
related to criminal justice are connected to the values of community psychology. 
Understanding the origins of the punishment goals that motivate and shape 
punishments can help in pursuing the goals of community psychology. 
This study used a categorization of moral concerns and a functionalist 
theory of emotion to predict support for different punishment goals. To test the 
predicted relations, a hypothesized model was tested against the study’s sample 
data. Most of the study’s variables were related in the sample data. It was 
expected that the hypothesized model, with specified relations between variables, 
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would reproduce the relations that were found in the sample data. Should the 
relations in the sample data be reproduced by the model, it could be concluded 
that the relations depicted in the model were the reasons for the relations in the 
sample data. The hypothesized model, however, did not reproduce the sample 
relations; that is, the model did not fit the data. 
The lack of fit may have been due to incorrectly omitting and/or including 
certain relations in the hypothesized model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Some 
important relations that produced the sample data may not have been represented 
in the model, while some unimportant relations may have been included. For 
example, to create a model that did fit the data, relations had to be added between 
an immoral nature and several emotions. Also, moral incompetence had to be 
removed as a mediator between the violations of ingroup and authority principles 
and the emotion of contempt.  
The hypothesized model was based on available theories of morality and 
emotion, as well as numerous studies. However, many of the predicted relations 
had not been explored in prior research, and some relations were not specified 
correctly in the hypothesized model. Although the hypothesized model did not fit 
the data, a majority of the predicted relations were significant and in the predicted 
direction. Furthermore, a modified model that did fit the data consisted mainly of 
paths that were direct or indirect paths in the hypothesized model. The following 
section will examine the predicted relations, whether or not they were supported 
in the final model, and how these findings relate to existing literature and theory. 
Discussion of the findings will be organized using four categories of punishment 
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goals: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restorative justice, and 
incapacitation. 
Retribution 
 The predicted relations that led to support for retribution were all 
significant in the hypothesized model (whether or not crime severity was included 
as a control). Harm and fairness violations predicted the appraisal of an immoral 
act, the appraisal of an immoral act predicted the emotion of anger, and anger 
predicted support for retribution. 
 The relations between harm and fairness violations and the appraisal of an 
immoral act support previous studies that found the consequences for individual 
victims predicted the perceived severity of criminal acts (Alter, Kernochan, & 
Darley, 2007; Blum-West, 1985; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; Rosenmerkel, 
2001; Warr, 1989). Also, crimes resulting in severe bodily injury and property 
theft have been rated as the most serious types of crime (Sellin & Wolfgang, 
1964). 
 The appraisal of an immoral act can then lead to a desire for retribution. 
When an immoral act is committed, an offender elevates himself or herself above 
a victimized party. By punishing the offender, the value of the victimized party is 
reaffirmed, the status of the offender is lowered, and a proper balance is attained 
(De Keijser et al., 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980).  
The relation between an immoral act and support for retribution was 
mediated by anger. These relations support a functionalist account of anger. 
Anger occurs by perceiving an injustice, motivates an action tendency to attack 
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the injustice, and dissipates once the injustice is addressed (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Fisher & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Public desires for 
retribution can therefore be fueled by anger and based on perceptions that an 
immoral act occurred in that an individual victim was wronged. 
In the fitted model, authority violations also predicted the appraisal of an 
immoral act. Theories of morality and social organization support such a finding. 
Social groups, particularly large groups, can benefit by taking intuitive moral 
views regarding behavior and formalizing them into group-level rules (Durkheim, 
1895/1982). Such rules can protect individual life and property and provide a 
general structure and order to social life. Justice systems, for example, can take 
moral views regarding the treatment of individuals and convert them into 
authoritative, group-level rules and laws. Because of the moral principles of the 
authority foundation, crimes can then be perceived as immoral acts, not only 
because of the content of the act (e.g., hurting an individual), but also because the 
offender is disobeying and disrespecting the group’s authoritative laws and values 
that protect individuals and provide order to the group (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). 
In the context of crime, the appraisal of an immoral act could therefore be based 
on the perception of an authority violation. By committing a crime, an offender 
could be seen as elevating himself or herself above the authority of law. 
Retribution could then be desired to reaffirm the value of the law and to lower the 
status of the offender. 
 In the fitted model, anger was also predicted by the appraisal that the 
offender possessed an immoral nature. This appraisal was predicted by purity 
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violations. Purity violations include displays of indecency and they can suggest 
that abnormalities exist within the moral minds of offenders (Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2011). Purity violations, and an immoral nature, can violate the moral 
integrity of a group and its shared moral identity (Rai & Fiske, 2011). An immoral 
nature is not an act but can still be an offense to the group, and could therefore 
require retributive punishment in the eyes of the surrounding public. The 
punishment would again lower the status of the offender and establish a proper 
moral balance between parties. 
The models suggest there are three types of social values or constructs that 
need to be vindicated by retribution after a crime has occurred. The three 
constructs are consistent with Shweder and colleagues’ three targets of moral 
concern: individuals, the community, and the divine (Shweder et al., 1997). Harm 
and fairness violations are acts against individuals, authority violations are acts 
against the community, and purity violations are acts against the divine (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Shweder et al., 1997). Crimes can therefore be seen as wronging 
three different parties: they can wrong an individual victim, they can wrong the 
community’s laws that provide order, and they can wrong the idea of decency that 
is intrinsic to the sacred concept of humanity. Anger can then be experienced in 
response to each of these violations, and retribution can be desired on behalf of 
each social construct that was victimized by a crime. 
One additional difference between the hypothesized model and the fitted 
model is that harm violations did not predict the appraisal of an immoral act in the 
fitted model. In the fitted model, authority violations accounted for some of the 
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variance in the appraisal of an immoral act and reduced the variance available for 
the harm and fairness violations. Fairness violations, however, still predicted an 
immoral act in the fitted model, and this may have been due to the types of crimes 
that were used in the study. Many of the crime scenarios included a monetary 
element, which may be connected to the fairness foundation, but did not depict an 
individual being harmed. Had different crimes been used (more severe crimes 
involving physical harm), the violation of harm may have predicted an immoral 
act in the fitted model. 
 The goal of retribution often receives more public support than other goals 
of punishment (Darley et al., 2000; Warr et al., 1983). Although retribution is 
often defined as gaining justice for the individual victim of a crime (e.g., Darley 
& Pittman, 2003) the public’s desires for retribution may not be based solely on 
concerns for individual victims. This study found that authority violations and 
purity violations also led to desires for retributive justice. The connections 
between moral violations and retribution were mediated by the appraisals of an 
immoral act and an immoral nature and by the emotion of anger. 
General and Individual Deterrence 
 Another goal of punishment is to create a psychological association 
between deviancy and punishment in the minds of potential offenders. The 
purpose of forming such an association is to deter future criminal behaviors. Since 
the goal of deterrence is different from the goal of retribution, a different emotion 
may be associated with the goal of deterrence and this emotion may be activated 
by different moral concerns. 
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All the predicted relations leading to general deterrence and individual 
deterrence were significant in the path analysis of the hypothesized model when 
crime severity was not included as a control. In the analysis that did include crime 
severity, the paths to and from fear were no longer significant. Furthermore, in the 
fitted model fear did not predict any of the punishment goals. It was expected that 
fear would predict general deterrence because an action tendency of fear is to 
avoid a threat and the goal of deterrence is to prevent future criminal behavior 
(Carlsmith, 2006; Lazarus, 1991). Prior research also found that fear predicted 
support for more punitive sentences (Klama & Egan, 2011; Sims, 2003). 
Prior findings involving fear, however, did not incorporate the potential 
effects of other emotions. The action tendencies of anger, contempt, and disgust, 
for example, are more assertive and hostile, while the action tendency of fear is 
more aligned with removing oneself from a threat than with aggressing against it 
(Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991). Public support for punishment may therefore be less 
affected by fear than by other emotions that are elicited by crime. 
Fear may also be experienced to a lesser degree than other emotions when 
considering crimes that are committed against others (as was the case in this 
study). Although fear, anger, and disgust are all elicited by perceiving a threat, 
fear occurs when the threat is stronger than the self and anger and disgust occur 
when the threat is weaker than the self (Lazarus, 1991). With the strength and size 
of the criminal justice system, the public may be more likely to feel anger and 
disgust in response to crimes than they are to feel fear. 
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 An emotion that did predict support for deterrence was contempt. 
Contempt predicted individual deterrence in the hypothesized model, and 
predicted both general and individual deterrence in the fitted model. The goal of 
deterrence is to deter people from committing crime and relies on punishment and 
the threat of punishment to achieve this end (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & 
Weaver, 1987). Contempt tends to depersonalize the target and to see them as 
morally inferior (Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003). Using punishment to control the 
behavior of an offender, and especially punishing an offender to control the 
behaviors of others, could be facilitated by feeling contempt for the offender. 
 Contempt was predicted by ingroup and authority violations in both the 
hypothesized and fitted models (the relation was mediated by moral incompetence 
in the hypothesized model). Ingroup and authority violations include failures to 
carry out the duties that a person has as a member of a group (Haidt & Graham, 
2007; Rozin et al., 1999). By committing a crime, an offender could be seen as 
displaying a contemptuous disregard for the rules of society or for the personal 
responsibilities that come with being a group member. A common elicitor of 
contempt is in fact the perception of contemptibility in others (Izard, 1991). An 
offender’s display of contempt for the group’s valued social norms could 
therefore elicit contempt in third-party observers. 
 The appraisal of moral incompetence did not mediate the relations 
between ingroup and authority violations and the feeling of contempt in the fitted 
model. This may have been due to the secondary appraisal of an immoral nature. 
Although the items for moral incompetence and an immoral nature formed 
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separate factors in a factor analysis, the two constructs were strongly correlated. 
Also, in the fitted model, purity violations predicted both secondary appraisals. 
The appraisal of an immoral nature then predicted contempt, and further relations 
involving moral incompetence were not needed to fit the model to the data. The 
construct of moral incompetence may be distinguishable from an immoral nature 
but the differentiation may require additional information about the offender. For 
example, the appraisal of moral incompetence may be more likely to occur toward 
child offenders while the appraisal of an immoral nature may be more likely to 
occur for adult offenders or offenders with a mental illness.  
 In summary, although the “fear of crime” is sometimes used in public 
commentary to explain support for punitive responses to crime, such as 
deterrence, the action tendency of fear is not consistent with behaving in a 
punitive manner, and fear did not predict support for punishment in this study. 
Rather, deterrence was predicted by feeling contempt, which acted as a mediator 
between group and purity moral violations and support for deterrence. 
Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice 
While the goal of deterrence is to prevent crime by punishing offenders, 
the goal of rehabilitation is to prevent crime by assisting offenders. Similarly, 
while the goal of retribution is to restore a balance between parties through 
punishment, the goal of restorative justice is to resolve the conflicts created by 
crime through participation and acceptance. The cognitive appraisals and 
emotions that predict support for rehabilitation and restorative justice are 
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therefore likely to differ from those that predict support for other punishment 
goals. 
It was sympathy for the offender that predicted support for rehabilitation 
and restorative justice in both the hypothesized and fitted models. Support for 
these punishment goals is therefore related to a concern for the offender and a 
behavioral disposition to offer assistance to the offender. 
It was expected that an appraisal of moral incompetence would be 
positively related to sympathy. The relation was not significant in the 
hypothesized model while controlling for crime severity or in the fitted model. In 
the hypothesized model without crime severity, moral incompetence was 
negatively related to sympathy. The two variables also had a negative bivariate 
correlation. The negative relation may indicate that the offender was perceived to 
be responsible for his or her state of moral incompetence, which would reduce 
sympathy for the offender. Sympathy is elicited when a person’s situation is 
perceived to be caused by the environment or factors outside the person’s control 
(Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Wickens et al., 2011). If additional information had been 
provided that indicated the incompetence was due to factors outside the offender’s 
control, sympathy for the offender may have occurred. Without any information 
about the cause, however, it appears there may be a tendency to assume the 
offender is responsible for his or her moral incompetence. 
 The predicted relation between an immoral nature and sympathy was 
nonsignificant in all the models. In the fitted model, however, an immoral nature 
predicted all the other emotions. The pattern may be explained by the elicitors of 
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the emotions. The elicitors of anger, fear, contempt, and disgust can all include 
some form of threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devos et al., 2003) and as the 
appraisal of an immoral nature increased, it is likely the perception of a threat 
increased. The elicitor of sympathy, on the other hand, is that a person needs and 
deserves assistance (Rudolph et al., 2004). It was expected that as the appraisal of 
an immoral nature increased, the offender would be seen as less deserving of 
assistance and would therefore receive less sympathy. Although this relation did 
not occur, a negative relation between authority violations and sympathy did (in 
the fitted model). Authority violations include disrespecting a group’s laws and 
values (Vidmar & Miller 1980), and this moral violation may lead to perceptions 
that an offender is less deserving of assistance and less deserving of sympathy. 
 Harm violations also predicted sympathy for the offender in the fitted 
model, and the relation was positive. The harm foundation pertains to concerns 
for the wellbeing of people as individuals and is somewhat distinct from concerns 
for the wellbeing of the group (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Graham et al., 2009). 
Perceiving harm to the individual victim of a crime, and feeling sympathy for the 
offender of a crime, may both be enhanced by a predisposition to feel concern for 
other individuals. Variance in this disposition across participants may have 
produced a relation between the two variables (a third-variable effect): 
participants who had more overall concern for individuals (via the harm moral 
foundation) had more concern for the individual victim of a crime and also had 
more concern for the offender.  
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Fairness violations also predicted support for rehabilitation, but the 
relation was not mediated by sympathy. Still, the fairness foundation also pertains 
to concerns for the wellbeing of individuals (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Grahamet 
al., 2009) and was related to support for rehabilitating the offender. 
 In summary, rehabilitation programs can help offenders lead more 
productive lives, and restorative approaches to punishment can help offenders 
reintegrate back into society (Marshall, 2003). These goals are primarily related to 
the action tendencies of sympathy. Feeling sympathy for offenders appears to 
stem from a general concern for the wellbeing of individuals, but sympathy can be 
reduced by perceiving crime as violations of the authority foundation.  
Incapacitation 
 The final goal of punishment is incapacitation. The goal of incapacitation 
is to forcibly restrict offenders, typically by physically isolating offenders in jails 
and prisons (Darley et al., 2000). Some of the strongest relations in the path 
models were those leading to incapacitation.  
The predicted relations between purity violations, an immoral nature, 
disgust, and support for incapacitation were significant in all the models. The 
results confirm previous findings that showed purity violations predicted the 
appraisal of an abnormal and less-than-human nature (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 
2011) and that the appraisal of an immoral nature predicted disgust (Hutcherson 
& Gross, 2011). The findings also show that the action tendency of disgust, which 
is to avoid or expel the source, predicted public support for the goal of 
incapacitation. 
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 In the fitted model, the appraisal of an immoral nature was the primary 
predictor of emotional reactions. The appraisal of an immoral nature, and the 
accompanying emotions, can justify and motivate punitive reactions and 
contribute to the isolation of offenders, both during the punishment process and 
afterward. Attributing the cause of a person’s behavior to a stable quality of the 
person is a fundamental process in human thinking (Reyna & Weiner, 2001; 
Weiner, 2006). Increasing the public’s awareness of environmental and situational 
factors that cause crime may decrease the appraisal of a stable, immoral nature 
and thereby decrease feelings of anger, fear, contempt, and disgust towards 
offenders. 
Implications for Theory 
Public attitudes regarding crime and punishment are interwoven with the 
criminal justice system. The moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001), emotions (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2000), and justice heuristics (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) 
of the public can interact with environmental norms and institutions to form 
social-moral systems for preventing and punishing immoral behavior (Haidt, 
2008). A justice system’s response to crime is therefore, to a significant degree, a 
public response to crime. Understanding public views of crime and punishment 
can contribute to understanding the ecology of the criminal justice system and the 
punishments that are issued to offenders (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Kelly, 1966; 
Trickett, 1984). 
The intuitive moral concerns of the public include concerns for 
individuals, groups, and purity. Not every individual, however, shares the same 
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moral concerns. Liberals tend to value harm and fairness moral principles more 
than conservatives, while conservatives tend to value ingroup, authority, and 
purity moral principles more than liberals (Graham et al., 2009). Most 
psychologists are liberal (Redding, 2001) and there may therefore be a greater 
focus on the harm and fairness foundations when studying the public’s moral 
concerns. Indeed, Kohlberg (1969) described the highest stage of moral reasoning 
as consisting of concerns for individual rights and wellbeing. A common view 
may therefore be that the harm and fairness foundations should play a central role 
in public reactions to crime. 
The findings of this study, however, found that other moral concerns, 
particularly authority and purity, were substantive predictors of emotional and 
punitive responses to crime. Some existing theories have also emphasized these 
group-related concerns. Tyler (1997) has suggested that individual rights and the 
sanctity of life are group-level values and that violations of these values 
symbolically harm the group. Tyler goes on to suggest that people desire 
punishment in order to defend the values and identity of the group. Vidmar and 
Miller (1980) have also stated that public concern with crime is primarily focused 
on protecting and preserving the group’s values and social order. Similarly, 
Weiner (2006) has suggested that the ultimate victim of crime is society itself. It 
can therefore be understood why, in many criminal justice systems, the 
prosecutors is said to represent “the people.” 
The study also found that fear did not play a prominent role in predicting 
support for punishment goals. An implication is that future research on public 
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support for punishment goals should perhaps focus more attention on anger, 
contempt, and disgust than on fear. The fear of crime could continue to be studied 
to understand and improve victim and community wellbeing, and to understand 
the views that politicians and judges may have regarding public concerns (Ouimet 
& Coyle, 1991), but the emotion may not be as relevant to understanding the 
general public’s support of punishment compared to anger, contempt, and disgust. 
However, the finding that fear did not contribute to the fit of the model may have 
been due to the mild harmful nature of the crimes Future research could establish 
whether and when fear increases support for punishment. 
 Community psychology supports the need for studying the psychological 
and environmental causes of criminal behavior in order to improve the 
effectiveness of crime prevention initiatives. Similarly, there is a need to study the 
psychological and environmental causes of punishment in order to improve the 
effectiveness of policy reform efforts. This paper considers the need for studying 
the ecology of the criminal justice system and for understanding public concerns 
with crime and punishment. 
Implications for Intervention 
 Understanding the moral views of the public can assist in framing policy 
reform recommendations that advance the values and goals of community 
psychology. The values of community psychology include preventing social and 
behavioral problems and promoting individual and community wellbeing (Dalton 
et al., 2007). Criminal behaviors can be reduced, and offender wellbeing 
increased, by offering rehabilitation programs (Coulter & VandeWeerd, 2009; 
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Jason et al., 2008; Liau et al., 2004; Seave, 2011; Van Stelle et al., 1994). Public 
support for rehabilitation could be increased by disseminating messages within 
public and legal domains that advocate for rehabilitation. Such messages should 
be designed to increase public and political receptivity to the goal of 
rehabilitation. Many of the emotions and punishment goals of the study were 
predicted by authority and purity violations. One approach to increasing support 
for rehabilitation would be to combine rehabilitation with authority and purity 
concerns. For example, associating rehabilitation with increased law-abiding 
behavior and decreased purity violations could resonate with the values and 
concerns of the public more than messages that focus primarily on the wellbeing 
of criminals. Ignoring the moral concerns of the audience, on the other hand, 
could increase resistance to reform recommendations. 
The appraisals that people make regarding offenders can also be 
considered when developing interventions for reforming the justice system. The 
appraisal that an offender committed an immoral act and the appraisal that an 
offender possessed an immoral nature were particularly likely to elicit emotional 
reactions, and perhaps these appraisals are the simplest ones to make when given 
limited information about a crime or an offender. The appraisal of an immoral act 
indirectly predicted support for retribution while the appraisal of an immoral 
nature indirectly predicted support for deterrence and incapacitation. These latter 
punishment goals can lead to more punitive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008). 
Support for punitive reactions to crime can therefore be increased when public 
attention is focused on the immoral nature of offenders or when the notion of a 
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“criminal element” is proposed to exist and to account for crime. Public focus 
should be directed toward the immoral act that is committed by crime rather than 
notions of an immoral nature. By doing so, punishments would more likely be 
guided by the goal of retribution rather than the more punitive goals of deterrence 
and incapacitation. 
Emphasizing the immoral act over an offender’s immoral nature would 
also allow the public to feel anger in response to crime but would reduce feelings 
of contempt and disgust. Anger is less enduring than contempt and disgust and 
also less problematic (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Allowing the public to feel 
anger, while decreasing contempt and disgust, could be a viable approach to 
satisfying the public’s need for justice while reducing public support for harsh 
punishments and lengthy terms of incarceration. 
Decreasing support for deterrence and incapacitation is one way in which 
public attitudes could be changed, but public attitudes could also be influenced in 
order to increase support for these punishment goals. Increasing the severity and 
certainty of punishment is often viewed as an effective way to reduce crime, and 
many people feel the criminal justice system should pursue the goals of deterrence 
and incapacitation (Carlsmith, 2008; Doob, 2000; Tyler, 1990).  
Public opinions are often influenced by group identities and group 
interests (Haidt, 2012). People will advocate for and support social norms and 
legal procedures that benefit their social groups. Unfortunately, offenders can 
often be perceived as forming a separate out-group of social outcasts (Western & 
Petit, 2010). Members of the public who perceive offenders as belonging to a 
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separate group may therefore be more supportive of punitive measures that are 
believed to control the criminal out-group. Such punitive measures, however, can 
increase the social and economic disadvantages of offenders and these 
disadvantages can perpetuate across an offender’s familial relations (Western & 
Petit, 2010). 
One reason for the present study was to understand the psychological 
origins of support for punishment so that interventions could be developed to 
modify public opinion. Naturally, the findings of such a study could be used to 
affect public opinion in any number of ways, and different people, with different 
group identities and different views of justice and crime prevention, could use the 
findings to pursue different objectives. Since people are often motivated by group 
interests, punishments that are less punitive towards offenders would likely be 
desired by groups that are in some way linked to offenders (e.g., ex-offender 
associations and communities that are negatively impacted by high incarceration 
rates). Mobilizing and increasing the political capital of these social groups would 
increase the likelihood that this study’s findings would be applied in a manner 
that reduces public support for punitive measures and increases public support for 
rehabilitation and restorative justice. 
Implications for Policy 
 The study presents several implications for policy. One implication is the 
influence of making a behavior illegal. The perception of authority violations was 
a substantive predictor of public support for punishment. This finding suggests 
that simply making an act illegal can elevate the moral wrongfulness of the act, as 
117 
 
 
the act is then violating a law of society. The moral wrongfulness of a crime 
influences the severity of punishment that is desired by the public (Pepitone & 
DiNubile, 1976). Similarly, the severity of punishment that is issued by the justice 
system conveys the degree of wrongfulness of an act (Tyler, 1990; Vidmar and 
Miller, 1980). Policies that mandate severe punishments for acts that are 
otherwise minor moral offences could create a cycle that produces high moral 
condemnation and unnecessarily high incarceration rates. Reducing the sentences 
for minor criminal acts, such as consensual sex acts (e.g., prostitution) and minor 
drug use, or even decriminalizing these acts, could be met with public support 
over time.  
 Another implication for policy has to do with the current trend toward 
prison privatization. Private corporations can own and operate prisons and lease 
prison beds to the state for profit. Market forces could motivate prison 
corporations to either advocate for longer terms of incarceration or to use their 
resources to reduce recidivism rates. Should the prison market be structured in a 
way that encourages advocating for increased incarceration, the findings of this 
study could be used to do so. The private prison market, however, could be geared 
toward decreasing recidivism. Specifically, policies should define the services 
that private prisons provide in terms of reduced recidivism rates rather than 
strictly in terms of secure incarceration. Corporations that compete to develop the 
best services, in order to gain government contracts, would then strive to reduce 
the recidivism rates of their prisoners.  
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 Policies could also be written for both public and private prisons to 
increase public perceptions regarding the humanity of offenders and decrease 
views that offenders possess immoral natures. Such efforts could increase public 
sympathy for offenders and lead to support for rehabilitation, decrease support for 
deterrence and incapacitation, and decrease the development of criminal identities 
in offenders (Pager, 2003). Prison policies could allow prisoners to have a few 
clothing options rather than a single prisoner uniform. A single uniform can 
reduce the view that prisoners are individuals and can dehumanize offenders 
(Bastian & Haslam, 2011). Community service programs could also be 
incorporated more often into sentences. Such programs would convey images of 
productivity and community involvement rather than images of physical isolation 
and stagnation. Changing the image of criminals could reduce the public´s use of 
an immoral nature schema when trying to understand the behavior of criminals. 
Limitations 
 Some limitations of the study exist. First, the study used a cross-sectional 
design which means the relations that were found between variables are not 
necessarily causal relations. Path analysis tests relations that are presumed to be 
causal but a path model can fit the data when relations are correlational or when 
they are causal but in the opposite direction as predicted (Kline, 2005). At the 
same time, the sequence of psychological events that was represented in the path 
model was based on a causal theory of emotion that has received widespread 
support from researchers (e.g., Izard, 1977; Weiner, 1985). The causal inferences 
that were made in this paper were therefore not based on the path analysis alone 
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but also on theory. However, alternative accounts could be made to explain the 
relations that were found in this study. One alternative account is that the 
emotional states of participants caused the appraisals that were made regarding 
the crime and the offender. Several researchers have proposed that emotions do 
not only carry action tendencies that shape behavior but they also have appraisal 
tendencies that shape judgments and evaluations (Chapman & Anderson, 2011; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Future research could include experimental studies to 
test whether the relations in the path model are causal and whether they occur in 
the predicted directions. 
 A second limitation was the small set of crimes. Although small sets of 
crimes have been used in prior research (e.g., Carlsmith, 2008; McFatter, 1982; 
Rucker et al., 2004), many types of crime may not have been adequately 
represented by the stimuli. For example, the three types of crime that make up the 
greatest portions of the federal prison population are drug offenses (50.1%), 
weapons, explosives, arson (15.5%), and immigration (10.5%) (Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, 2014). The crime scenarios used in the study did not depict these crimes, 
nor many other types of crimes. Although the crimes used in the study formed a 
diverse set of crimes, some of the tested relations may be dependent on the type of 
crime and would therefore be affected by the crimes that were used. For example, 
many of the crimes may have violated the fairness foundation but not the harm 
foundation. This may be why fairness violations predicted the appraisal of an 
immoral act, in the fitted model, while harm violations did not. Future research 
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could determine whether the relations examined here vary across crime type, and 
could verify which relations occur for crimes in general. 
 Another limitation is that the crimes were not very severe. This was done 
deliberately in order to avoid ceiling effects for some of the variables. For 
example, in a previous study of crime severity, the “planned killing of an 
acquaintance” received a mean severity rating of 8.09 on a 9-point scale (Rossi, 
Waite, Bose, & Berk, 1974). Using such a crime in the study could have resulted 
in negatively skewed distributions for some of the variables, which could have 
impacted the analyses of the path models (Kline, 2005). However, more severe 
crimes may also generate different reactions to crime and should be investigated 
in future studies. 
A final limitation is that a single-study design was used to develop the 
fitted model. Although the overall model had adequate fit with the data, some 
parts of the model may have fit the data better than other parts (Kline, 2005). It is 
possible that some segments of the model may fluctuate across samples and study 
designs in a way that would require the model to be changed in order to achieve 
fit. The fitted model should therefore be retested with different scenarios and with 
different samples to identify the more robust aspects of the model. 
Future Research   
Several areas for future research exist, both within the paradigm of the 
study and beyond. One area is to further explore the constructs themselves. Some 
of the constructs may need to be combined while others may need to be divided. 
The emotions of anger and disgust loaded on the same factor in the initial factor 
121 
 
 
analysis. Although these emotions have been found to be distinct in prior research 
on moral transgressions (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), they have also been 
found to merge. For example, Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) investigated 
reactions to crimes and found that moral outrage is a combination of anger and 
disgust. Future research is needed to determine when these emotions function 
separately and when they operate together. 
 Additional research could also be done on the punishment goals. General 
deterrence and individual deterrence did not emerge as distinct factors in the 
study. This has also occurred in other studies (e.g., McFatter, 1982), but some 
have argued the goals are in fact distinct and are predicted by different things. For 
example, Carlsmith (2006) argues that support for general deterrence increases 
when a certain crime occurs more often and when detection and prosecution rates 
for the crime are low. Further research could determine when general and 
individual deterrence form a homogeneous goal and when support for the two 
deterrence goals are independent. 
 The punishment goal of retribution may need to be split into multiple 
goals. The goal of retribution has sometimes been described as providing justice 
for the individual victim of a crime and sometimes as reasserting the values of 
society (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Also, de Keijser and colleagues (2002) found 
that items measuring “just deserts” and items measuring the restoration of a moral 
balance loaded on separate factors in a confirmatory factor analysis. There may 
therefore be multiple factors that exist within the abstract concept of retribution. 
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 Restorative justice may also need to be divided into several components. 
Participation by various parties (i.e., the victim, offender, and community 
members), addressing the needs of various parties, and reintegrating the offender 
into the community can all be objectives of restorative justice (De Keijser et al., 
2002; Gromet & Darley, 2009; Marshall, 2003). Determining whether these 
elements form distinct punishment goals, and if so, determining what factors 
predict support for each element could be areas for future research. 
 The reintegration of offenders into their communities is an important area 
for future research and it is related to the values of community psychology. This 
study found that, across a variety of crimes, offenders can be perceived as 
possessing an immoral nature. This could produce a form of prejudice toward 
offenders that makes it difficult for them to enter social circles and to gain 
employment. Studying how prejudicial views of offenders could be reduced 
would help with offender reintegration. 
An offender’s demographics may be an additional factor that affects 
public support for punishment goals. Punishments are justified wrongs; they are 
issued in part to reinforce societal values and to send a message about the 
consequences of crime (Carlsmith, 2006; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The 
application of punishments to achieve these social goals can be facilitated by the 
moral status of the offender: those with a lower moral status can be treated with 
less moral regard and therefore punished more readily (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994). 
People of low status, such as the poor and racial minorities, may receive more 
punishments (Byrne & Taxman, 1994). The punishments issued to low status 
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offenders can serve a social purpose while being less likely to violate moral 
principles regarding the treatment of individuals (Gerber & Jackson, 2013). 
Future studies could combine the constructs used in this study with demographic 
characteristics of offenders to further study public support for punishment goals. 
The demographics of offenders could also influence the decisions that are 
made by parties within the justice system. For example, Black and Latino 
defendants are more likely to be denied bail during pretrial processing compared 
to White defendants (Schlesinger, 2005). One cause of this racial disparity could 
be perceptions that Black and Latino people are more likely to have an immoral 
nature compared to White people. Such an appraisal could lead justice personnel 
to act toward incapacitation and to deny minority defendants release on bail. 
Future studies could sample different parties within the criminal justice system to 
determine what appraisals (e.g., an immoral nature) are being applied when 
making legal decisions and sentencing recommendations. 
Other variables could also be added to the model to more fully predict 
support for the punishment goals. For example, the intent of the offender and the 
purpose for committing a crime have both been related to judgments of offenders 
and support for punishment goals (Alter et al., 2007; Darley & Pittman, 2003; 
Hansel, 1987; Weiner et al., 1997). 
 
 Weiner’s (1985, 1986) five dimensions of causality could also be 
investigated. Weiner proposed that emotional reactions to behavior are 
determined by whether the cause of the behavior is seen as controllable, 
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intentional, local, stable, and global. Furthermore, Weiner suggested that the 
attributions a person makes is affected by personal history, social norms, causal 
rules, as well as many other factors. Investigating these factors could contribute to 
understanding public reactions to crime. 
 Not only could additional variables be included in the model, but 
components of the model could be used to study public opinions on matters other 
than crime. For example, support for not granting citizenship to immigrants, and 
for increasing border security to reduce the movement of immigrants, could be 
based on moral concerns related to the ingroup foundation. Immigrants could be 
perceived as violating the cultural soundness of the ingroup, which could then 
lead to feelings of contempt toward immigrants and support for measures that 
would deter people from attempting to immigrate. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, public opinions about criminal justice can affect the 
decision-making processes that create criminal justice policies. Current policies 
lead to sizeable numbers of punishments being issued every year, and these 
punishments can impair the lives of many people who commit crimes. 
Understanding the public’s views regarding crime and criminal justice is 
necessary for developing effective reform initiatives aimed at improving the 
criminal justice system. This study investigated how moral appraisals and 
appraisals of offenders predicted emotional reactions to crime and support for a 
variety of punishment goals. Authority and purity violations emerged as 
noteworthy moral concerns. They predicted contempt and disgust, which in turn 
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predicted support for deterrence and incapacitation. Understanding these aspects 
of crime that shape public opinion is necessary for developing reforms that 
receive public support. 
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Appendix A 
Pilot Study – Moral Foundations 
The following instructions, variable descriptions, and items were presented to 
participants: 
It has been proposed that there are five types of moral violations 
that people can commit. The five types are described as follows: 
 Harm: A person commits a moral violation if they harm another 
individual. Examples include hurting someone physically or emotionally. 
Fairness: A person commits a moral violation if they do not 
contribute their fair share or if they do not repay someone for helping 
them. Examples include cheating, stealing, or getting something that is not 
deserved. 
Ingroup: A person commits a moral violation if they are not loyal 
to a group they belong to. Examples include not protecting the integrity or 
honor of the group, not defending the group, or betraying the group in 
some way. 
Authority: A person commits a moral violation if they do not fulfill 
their own individual social responsibilities within a social structure. 
Examples include not meeting the expectations of one’s social role, not 
obeying or respecting legitimate authority figures and traditions, or 
authority figures making decisions that are not in the interests of their 
subordinates. 
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Purity: A person commits a moral violation if they degrade or 
defile the sanctity of something. Examples include acting in an impure or 
disgusting manner, polluting the human body, or desecrating a religious 
symbol. 
Listed below are items describing an offender’s actions. The 
actions may be moral violations according to the types of violations 
described above. Decide which moral violation is being committed in the 
actions below. You can also select “none” of the violations. Do not 
consider whether you agree or disagree with the morality of the moral 
violations. Just consider the content of the moral violations above and the 
content of the action items below, and decide if they match. 
Harm 
1. The offender’s actions caused direct harm to other individuals. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
2. The offender’s actions caused direct physical, emotional, or material damage 
to other individuals. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
3. The offender caused another individual to suffer. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
4. The offender acted in a cruel manner. 
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____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
5. The offender’s actions were violent. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
6. The offender inflicted pain on another person. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
Fairness 
1. The offender tried to get something he or she did not deserve. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
2. The offender cheated others for personal gain. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
3. The offender acted unfairly. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
4. The offender took something that did not belong to him or her. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
5. The offender acted in an unjust manner. 
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____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
6. The offender violated someone’s rights. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
Ingroup 
1. The offender betrayed other people. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
2. The offender put himself or herself above the wellbeing of his or her group. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
3. The offender showed a lack of loyalty. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
4. The offender broke the rules of being a team player. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
5. The offender undermined the stability of a group he or she belongs to. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
6. The offender put his or her interests above the interests of his or her group. 
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____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
Authority 
1. The offender’s actions showed disrespect for important traditions or 
institutions of society. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
2. The offender failed to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of his or her 
specific role within a social group. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
3. The offender’s actions could cause social chaos. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
4. The offender’s actions broke the rules that maintain social order. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
5. The offender’s actions disrespected people or organizations that should be 
respected. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
6. The offender did not comply with important social norms. 
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____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
Purity 
1. The offender’s actions violated natural standards of decency. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
2. The offender’s actions were degrading to himself/herself or to others. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
3. The offender acted in an unnatural manner. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
4. The offender’s actions were inconsistent with human dignity. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
5. The offender acted like an animal. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
6. The offender’s behavior was not virtuous. 
____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
7. The offender’s behavior was impure. 
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____ Harm  ____ Fairness  ____ Ingroup  ____ Authority  ____ Purity  
____ None 
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Appendix B 
Pilot Study – Secondary Appraisals 
The following instructions, variable descriptions, and items were presented to 
participants: 
 We are interested in three types of judgments that can be made 
when a person commits a moral violation. These judgments concern the 
offender’s actions, competencies, and nature and are described as follows: 
 Immoral act: The act committed by the offender is a moral 
violation. 
Moral incompetence: The offender lacks the knowledge, skills, or 
abilities to understand or follow moral rules. 
Immoral nature: The offender is inhuman, abnormal, or evil. 
Listed below are items describing specific judgments. Determine 
whether the specific judgments below match one of the judgment types 
above. You can also select “none” of the judgment types. Do not consider 
whether you agree or disagree with the nature of the judgment. Just 
consider the content of the specific judgments below and the content of the 
judgment types above, and decide if they match. 
Immoral Act 
1. The act committed by the offender is wrong. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
2. The act committed by the offender violates moral principles. 
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____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
3. The act committed by the offender is immoral. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
4. The act committed by the offender is unacceptable. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
5. The act committed by the offender is a moral transgression. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
Moral Incompetence 
1. The offender lacks the abilities to follow moral rules. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
2. The offender is unable to abide by moral codes. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
3. The offender is not able to conduct himself or herself according to what is 
right. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
4. The offender is incapable of behaving appropriately. 
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____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
5. The offender lacks knowledge about moral rules. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
6. The offender is ignorant of moral principles. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
7. The offender lacks the skills to behave in a moral manner. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
Immoral Nature 
1. The offender has an immoral character. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
2. The offender has an evil nature. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
3. The offender is a bad person. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
4. The offender is abnormal. 
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____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
5. The offender is inhuman. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
6. The offender is less than human. 
____ Immoral act  ____ Moral incompetence  ____ Immoral nature  ____ 
None 
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Appendix C 
Pilot Study – Emotions 
The following instructions, variables, and items were presented to participants: 
 We are interested in studying five emotions. These emotions are  
Anger     Fear     Contempt     Disgust     Sympathy 
Listed below are several emotions. For each emotion listed below, 
indicate which of the above emotions it is most similar to. You can also 
select “none” of the above emotions. 
Anger 
Angry 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Furious 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Outrage 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Fear 
Fear 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Afraid 
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____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Frightened 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Contempt: First Iteration 
Contempt 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Disdain 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Scornful 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Contempt: Second Iteration 
Disgrace 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Despise 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Disrespect 
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____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Condescension 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Disregard 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Sympathy 
Sympathy 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Compassion 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Pity 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Disgust 
Disgust 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Revulsion 
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____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
Sickened 
____ Anger  ____ Fear  ____ Contempt  ____ Sympathy  ____ Disgust  
____ None 
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Appendix D 
Pilot Study – Punishment Goals 
The following instructions, variable descriptions, and items were presented to 
participants: 
 When a person is convicted of a crime, they are given a sentence 
by the criminal justice system. It has been suggested that there are six 
types of goals that guide the justice system’s sentencing decisions. The six 
goals are described as follows: 
 Retribution: The sentence should penalize the offender in 
accordance with what he or she deserves for having committed the crime. 
The punishment to the offender should be equal to the wrongfulness of the 
crime. When retribution is achieved, the offender has “paid the debt owed 
to society.” 
Incapacitation: The sentence should physically prevent the 
offender from committing another crime by restraining him or her in some 
way, such as by confining the offender and isolating him from society. 
When incapacitation is achieved, the offender would not be able to 
commit another crime even he wanted to. 
Individual deterrence: The sentence should teach the offender that 
committing a crime will bring a negative consequence to him or her. The 
sentence shows the offender that “crime doesn’t pay.” When individual 
deterrence is achieved, the offender will not commit another crime 
because he now has a fear of punishment. 
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General deterrence: The sentence should show people in the 
general public that if they commit a crime, they will be punished. The 
sentence shows people in general that “crime doesn’t pay.” When general 
deterrence is achieved, potential offenders in the general public will not 
commit a crime because they have a fear of punishment. 
Rehabilitation: The sentence should address the behavioral and 
psychological deficiencies that contributed to the crime. The sentence 
could include substance use treatment, counseling, education, or job 
training. When rehabilitation is achieved, the offender would be a law-
abiding and productive member of society. 
 Restoration: The sentence should restore and heal the individuals 
affected by the crime and the damaged social relationships between them. 
The offender, victim, and others in the community meet to present their 
views of the crime and decide on a sentence. When restoration is achieved, 
the victim is materially and psychologically restored, and the offender is 
re-accepted as a member of the community. 
Listed below are items describing specific sentencing goals and 
considerations. Determine whether the specific items below match one of 
the general goals described above. You can also select “none” of the goals 
described above. Do not consider whether you agree or disagree with the 
nature of the punishment goal. Just consider the content of the specific 
items below and the content of the general goals above, and decide if they 
match. 
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Retribution 
1. The sentence should punish the offender for having committed a crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
2. The sentence should provide a punishment that is in proportion to the severity 
of the crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
3. The sentence should make the offender pay the debt he or she owes to society. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
4. The sentence should be equal to what the offender deserves for his or her 
actions. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
5. The sentence should give the offender his or her “just deserts.” 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
6. The sentence should make the offender suffer in proportion to the suffering he 
or she has caused. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
7. The sentence should enforce justice against the offender. 
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____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
8. The sentence should be based on the rule “an eye for an eye.” 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
9. The sentence should even out the wrong that the offender has done. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
General Deterrence 
1. The sentence should discourage people in the general public from committing 
a similar crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
2. The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the general public to 
reduce the likelihood that others will commit a similar crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
3. The sentence should show members of the general public that they would be 
punished it they committed the same crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
4. The sentence should be made public to prevent other people from committing 
the crime. 
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____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
5. The sentence should send a message to others that crimes such as this one will 
be punished. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
6. The sentence should be heavy enough in order to discourage other potential 
offenders from committing the crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
Individual Deterrence 
1. The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the offender to reduce 
the likelihood that he or she will commit the crime again. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
2. The sentence should discourage the offender from committing further crimes. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
3. The sentence should teach the offender that committing a crime does not go 
unpunished. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
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4. The sentence should be more severe than usual to prevent the offender from 
committing a crime in the future. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
5. The sentence should show the offender that “crime doesn’t pay.” 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
6. The sentence should demonstrate to the offender what will happen to him if he 
commits another crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
Rehabilitation 
1. The sentence should offer programs to the offender that will help him or her 
be a productive member of society. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
2. The sentence should include education and/or work-training opportunities. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
3. The sentence should include rehabilitation programs. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
4. The sentence should include counseling and therapy. 
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____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
5. The sentence should help the offender get back on the right track. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
6. The sentence should make the offender learn the norms and values of law-
abiding society. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
Restorative 
1. The sentence should provide an opportunity for the offender to apologize to 
those directly affected by the crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
2. The sentence should be partly based on input from the offender. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
3. The sentence should allow the offender to be restored as an equal member of 
the community. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
4. The sentence should enable the shame from the crime to be removed from the 
offender. 
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____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
5. The sentence should permit the offender and victim to discuss the crime as 
well as alternative sentencing options. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
6. The sentence should allow both offender and victim to heal psychologically. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
7. The sentence should remove the stigma of being a criminal from the offender. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
8. The sentence should resolve the conflict between the victim and offender. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
9. The sentence should require the offender to provide restitution and 
compensation to the victim. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
Incapacitation 
1. The sentence should isolate the offender from the general public. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
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2. The sentence should physically confine the offender for the protection of 
society.  
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
3. The sentence should restrict the offender’s freedoms so he or she cannot 
commit another crime. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
4. The sentence should separate the offender from the rest of society. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
5. The sentence should remove the offender from society. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
6. The sentence should keep the offender locked up for the safety of society. 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
7. The sentence should follow the rule “lock ‘em up and throw away the key.” 
____ Retribution  ____ Incapacitation  ____ Individual deterrence  ____ 
General deterrence  ____ Rehabiliation  ____ Restoration  ____ None 
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Appendix E 
Percent Frequency Distributions of Sample Demographics – Main Study 
 
Gender % 
Female 56 
Male 41 
Other 1 
Missing 2 
 
Race/Ethnicity % 
White 83 
Black 7 
Asian American 3 
Latino/a 2 
Multiracial 2 
Native American 1 
Other 1 
Missing 1 
 
Political 
Affiliation % 
Democrat 35 
Independent 26 
Republican 17 
None 13 
Libertarian 5 
Green Part 1 
Other 1 
Missing 2 
 
Religious 
Affiliation % 
Protestant 23 
None 18 
Atheist 15 
Catholic 13 
Agnostic 12 
Other 11 
Judaism 2 
Buddhist 2 
Mormon 1 
Unitarian 1 
Missing 2 
 
 
 
 
Highest Level of 
Education % 
Some high school 2 
High school graduate 12 
Some college 26 
Technical training 2 
Associate degree 10 
Bachelor’s degree 36 
Master’s degree 7 
Professional degree 2 
Doctorate degree 1 
Missing 2 
 
Yearly Household 
Income % 
Less than $20,000 18 
$20,000 to $39,999 32 
$40,000 to $59,999 19 
$60,000 to $79,999 11 
$80,000 to $99,999 7 
$100,000to $119,999 5 
$120,000 to $139,999 2 
$140,000 or more 4 
Missing 2 
 
Convicted 
of a Crime % 
No 90 
Yes 8 
Missing 2 
 
Victim of 
a Crime % 
No 52 
Yes 46 
Missing 2 
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Appendix F 
Example Items – Main Study 
Moral Foundations Scale: Harm Foundation Instructions:  Please select a number below each statement that indicates the 
degree to which you think the following happened. 
The offender’s actions caused direct harm to other individuals. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all  Somewhat  Extremely 
Secondary Appraisals Scale: Immoral Act Instructions:  Please select the number below each statement that indicates the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
The act committed by the offender is wrong. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Strongly 
disagree    
Strongly 
agree 
 
Emotions Scale: Anger Instructions:  Indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions 
when thinking about the offender or the offender’s actions. Angry 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Do not feel 
this at all    
Feel this 
very strongly 
 
Punishment Goals Scale: Retribution 
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Instructions:  The person described in the event has been found guilty of 
committing the crime. When a person has been found guilty of a crime, a 
sentence is issued that can vary in severity, serve different goals, and consist of 
different types of sanctions. Some examples of sanctions are incarceration, 
probation, a fine, community service, restitution (i.e., the offender pays money 
to the victim), and rehabilitation programs. 
When thinking about the sentence the offender should receive for 
committing this crime, to what extent are the following sentencing goals and 
considerations important to you? 
The sentence should punish the offender for having committed a crime. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all 
important  
Somewhat 
important  
Extremely 
important 
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Appendix G 
Demographics Survey 
Please indicate the following. 
Gender:  _____ Female  _____ Male  _____ Other 
Age:  _____ 
Race/ethnicity: 
_____ Asian American/Pacific Islander 
_____ Black/African American 
_____ East Indian/Pakistani 
_____ Latino(a)/Hispanic 
_____ Middle Eastern 
_____ Native American 
_____ White/Caucasion 
_____ Multiracial/Multiethnic (Please specify) ___________________ 
_____ Other (Please specify) ___________________ 
 
Political affiliation:  _____ Democrat  _____ Republican _____ Libertarian _____ 
Green Party  _____ Independent      _____ None  _____ Other (Please specify) 
_____________________ 
When it comes to social issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal, 
conservative, or moderate? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
liberal 
Liberal Moderate, 
leaning 
toward 
liberal 
Moderate Moderate, 
leaning 
toward 
conservative 
Conservative Strongly 
conservative 
 
When it comes to economic issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal, 
conservative, or moderate? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
liberal 
Liberal Moderate, 
leaning 
toward 
Moderate Moderate, 
leaning 
toward 
Conservative Strongly 
conservative 
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liberal conservative 
 
What is your present religion, if any? 
_____  Protestant 
_____  Roman Catholic (Catholic) 
_____  Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints/LDS) 
_____  Orthodox (Greek, Russian or some other orthodox church) 
_____  Jewish (Judaism) 
_____  Muslim (Islam) 
_____  Buddhist 
_____  Hindu 
_____  Unitarian 
_____  Atheist (do not believe in God) 
_____  Agnostic (not sure if there is a God) 
_____  Nothing in particular 
_____  Something else (Please specify) __________________ 
 
How religious/spiritual are you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
religious 
  Somewhat 
religious 
  Extremely 
religious 
 
How important is your religion/spirituality to your personal identity? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
  Somewhat 
important 
  Extremely 
important 
 
How often do you attend religious services or events? 
_____ Never  _____ Once a year  _____ Once a month  _____ Once a week  ____ 
A few times a week 
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently 
enrolled, highest degree received. 
_____  No schooling completed 
_____  Nursery school to 8th grade 
_____  Some high school, no diploma 
_____  High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED) 
_____  Some college credit, no degree 
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_____  Trade/technical/vocational training 
_____  Associate degree 
_____  Bachelor’s degree 
_____  Master’s degree 
_____  Professional degree 
_____  Doctorate degree  
 
Please indicate your yearly household or family income before taxes. 
Less than $20,000 
$20,000 to $39,999 
$40,000 to $59,999 
$60,000 to $79,999 
$80,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $119,999 
$120,000 to $139,999 
$140,000 or more 
 
Have you ever been convicted of a crime?  _____ Yes  _____No 
Have you ever been the victim of a crime?  _____ Yes  _____No 
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Appendix H 
Factor Analysis of Moral Foundations Items 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 
Harm      
 The offender’s actions caused direct harm to other 
individuals.  .79    
 The offender’s actions caused direct physical, emotional, or 
material damage to other individuals.  .71    
 The offender caused another individual to suffer.  .76    
 The offender acted in a cruel manner.  .74    
 The offender’s actions were violent.  .84    
 The offender inflicted pain on another person.  .89    
Fairness      
 The offender tried to get something he or she did not 
deserve.   .80   
 The offender cheated others for personal gain.   .81   
 The offender acted unfairly. .40  .40   
 The offender took something that did not belong to him or 
her.   .87   
- The offender acted in an unjust manner. .52  .37   
Ingroup      
 The offender betrayed other people.   .34  .38 
 The offender put himself or herself above the wellbeing of 
his or her group.     .72 
 The offender showed a lack of loyalty.    .30 .54 
 The offender broke the rules of being a team player.     .62 
 The offender undermined the stability of a group he or she 
belongs to.     .77 
 The offender put his or her interests above the interests of his 
or her group.     .65 
Authority      
 The offender’s actions showed disrespect for important 
traditions or institutions of society. .79     
 The offender’s actions could cause social chaos. .38    .31 
 The offender’s actions broke the rules that maintain social 
order. .76     
 The offender’s actions disrespected people or organizations 
that should be respected. .64     
 The offender did not comply with important social norms. .75     
Purity      
 The offender’s actions violated natural standards of decency. .44   .47  
- The offender’s actions were degrading to himself/herself or 
to others  .32    
 The offender acted in an unnatural manner.    .58  
 The offender’s actions were inconsistent with human dignity. .32   .37  
- The offender acted like an animal.  .59  .36  
- The offender’s behavior was not virtuous. .46     
 The offender’s behavior was impure.    .54  
Note.   Loadings > .30 are reported. 
“-” beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale. 
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Appendix I 
Factor Analysis of Secondary Appraisals Items 
Item 1 2 3 
Immoral Act    
 The act committed by the offender is wrong.  .84  
 The act committed by the offender violates moral principles.  .88  
 The act committed by the offender is immoral.  .83  
 The act committed by the offender is unacceptable.  .80  
 The act committed by the offender is a moral transgression.  .76  
Moral Incompetence    
 The offender lacks the abilities to follow moral rules. .82   
 The offender is unable to abide by moral codes. .87   
 The offender is not able to conduct himself or herself 
according to what is right. .85   
 The offender is incapable of behaving appropriately. .78   
 The offender lacks knowledge about moral rules. .71   
 The offender is ignorant of moral principles. .63   
 The offender lacks the skills to behave in a moral manner. .81   
Immoral Nature    
- The offender has an immoral character.  .50 .33 
 The offender has an evil nature.   .68 
 The offender is a bad person.  .37 .47 
 The offender is abnormal.   .44 
 The offender is inhuman.   .79 
 The offender is less than human.   .81 
Note.   Loadings > .30 are reported. 
“-” beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale. 
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Appendix J 
Factor Analysis of Emotions Items 
All Emotions 
Item 1 2 3 
Anger    
 Angry .81   
 Furious .83   
 Outrage .86   
Fear    
 Fear   .93 
 Afraid   .90 
 Frightened   .93 
Contempt    
 Contempt .79   
 Disdain .86   
 Scornful .81   
 Disrespect .67   
 Condescension .60   
Sympathy    
 Sympathy  .93  
 Compassion  .87  
 Pity  .75  
Disgust    
 Disgust .86   
 Revulsion .77   
 Sickened .74   
Note.   Loadings > .30 are reported. 
“-” beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale. 
 
Anger, Contempt, and Disgust 
Item 1 2 3 
Anger    
 Angry .78   
 Furious .80   
 Outrage .76   
Contempt    
 Contempt  .72  
 Disdain  .70  
 Scornful  .59  
 Disrespect  .61  
 Condescension  .77  
Disgust    
 Disgust   .48 
 Revulsion   .91 
 Sickened   .72 
Note.   Loadings > .30 are reported. 
“-” beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale.  
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Appendix K 
Factor Analysis of Punishment Goals Items 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 
Retribution      
- The sentence should punish the offender for having committed 
a crime. .69     
 The sentence should provide a punishment that is in proportion 
to the severity of the crime.     .74 
 The sentence should make the offender pay the debt he or she 
owes to society. .43     
 The sentence should be equal to what the offender deserves for 
his or her actions.     .74 
 The sentence should give the offender his or her “just deserts.” .32  .37   
 The sentence should make the offender suffer in proportion to 
the suffering he or she has caused.     .35 
 The sentence should be based on the rule “an eye for an eye.”   .51   
General Deterrence      
 The sentence should discourage people in the general public 
from committing a similar crime. .99     
 The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the 
general public to reduce the likelihood that others will 
commit a similar crime. 
.81     
 The sentence should show members of the general public that 
they would be punished it they committed the same crime. .94     
 The sentence should be made public to prevent other people 
from committing the crime. .76     
 The sentence should send a message to others that crimes such 
as this one will be punished. .91     
 The sentence should be heavy enough in order to discourage 
other potential offenders from committing the crime. .87     
Individual Deterrence      
 The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the 
offender to reduce the likelihood that he or she will 
commit the crime again. 
.74     
 The sentence should discourage the offender from committing 
further crimes. .79     
 The sentence should teach the offender that committing a 
crime does not go unpunished. .81     
 The sentence should show the offender that “crime doesn’t 
pay.” .76     
 The sentence should demonstrate to the offender what will 
happen to him if he commits another crime. .74     
Rehabilitation      
 The sentence should offer programs to the offender that will 
help him or her be a productive member of society.  .84    
 The sentence should include education and/or work-training 
opportunities.  .78    
 The sentence should include rehabilitation programs.  .90    
 The sentence should include counseling and therapy.  .80    
 The sentence should help the offender get back on the right 
track.  .64    
- The sentence should make the offender learn the norms and 
values of law-abiding society. .74     
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Restorative      
 The sentence should provide an opportunity for the offender to 
apologize to those directly affected by the crime.    .49  
 The sentence should allow the offender to be restored as an 
equal member of the community.   -.35 .33  
 The sentence should enable the shame from the crime to be 
removed from the offender.    .44  
 The sentence should permit the offender and victim to discuss 
the crime as well as alternative sentencing options.    .61  
- The sentence should allow both offender and victim to heal 
psychologically.  .47  .40  
 The sentence should resolve the conflict between the victim 
and offender.    .74  
Incapacitation      
 The sentence should isolate the offender from the general 
public.   .87   
 The sentence should physically confine the offender for the 
protection of society.   .90   
 The sentence should restrict the offender’s freedoms so he or 
she cannot commit another crime.   .68   
 The sentence should separate the offender from the rest of 
society.   .88   
 The sentence should remove the offender from society.   .89   
 The sentence should keep the offender locked up for the safety 
of society.   .89   
Note.   Loadings > .30 are reported. 
“-” beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale. 
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Appendix L 
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Crime 
Moral Foundations 
Crime Harm M (SD) 
Fairness 
M (SD) 
Ingroup 
M (SD) 
Authority 
M (SD) 
Purity 
M (SD) 
Alcohol to minors 3.15 (1.70) 3.62 (1.92) 4.98 (2.07) 6.04 (2.12) 3.94 (2.21) 
Counterfeit money 3.84 (1.71) 7.98 (1.20) 6.20 (1.62) 6.70 (1.54) 5.00 (1.94) 
Mugging 7.59 (1.24) 7.83 (1.27) 5.54 (1.90) 6.83 (1.39) 6.50 (1.71) 
Protester pushes officer 5.07 (1.86) 2.95 (1.60) 4.40 (1.88) 6.16 (2.00) 4.10 (2.02) 
Note:  Subscales range from 1 to 9. 
 
Secondary Appraisals 
Crime Act M (SD) 
Incompetence 
M (SD) 
Nature 
M (SD) 
Alcohol to minors 5.76 (2.18) 4.01 (2.04) 2.75 (1.59) 
Counterfeit money 7.00 (1.65) 4.06 (2.01) 3.06 (1.50) 
Mugging 7.50 (1.35) 4.32 (2.09) 3.78 (1.92) 
Protester pushes officer 4.93 (2.13) 3.65 (2.10) 2.40 (1.50) 
Note:  Subscales range from 1 to 9. 
 
Emotions 
Crime Anger M (SD) 
Fear 
M (SD) 
Contempt 
M (SD) 
Sympathy 
M (SD) 
Disgust 
M (SD) 
Alcohol to minors 3.92 (2.48) 2.09 (1.78) 3.97 (2.17) 2.05 (1.35) 3.36 (2.35) 
Counterfeit money 3.72 (2.27) 1.63 (1.26) 4.41 (1.93) 2.54 (1.80) 3.24 (2.08) 
Mugging 4.96 (2.49) 3.22 (2.29) 4.41 (2.13) 4.67 (2.15) 4.73 (2.43) 
Protester pushes officer 3.16 (2.14) 2.02 (1.53) 3.35 (1.96) 3.36 (2.03) 2.79 (2.02) 
Note:  Subscales range from 1 to 9. 
 
Punishment Goals 
Crime Ret. M (SD) 
Gen. Det. 
M (SD) 
Ind. Det. 
M (SD) 
Rehab. 
M (SD) 
Rest. 
M (SD) 
Inc. 
M (SD) 
Alcohol to minors 5.17(1.63) 6.15 (2.16) 6.32 (2.11) 5.01 (2.29) 4.88 (1.80) 3.21 (2.16) 
Counterfeit money 6.25 (1.45) 6.66 (2.02) 7.23 (1.57) 6.15 (2.09) 5.71 (1.50) 4.31 (2.21) 
Mugging 5.87 (1.71) 6.37 (2.04) 7.01 (1.77) 6.98 (2.14) 5.56 (1.72) 4.91 (2.20) 
Protester pushes officer 5.27 (1.65) 5.32 (2.40) 5.65 (2.28) 5.28 (2.21) 5.81 (1.69) 2.84 (2.03) 
Note:  Subscales range from 1 to 9. 
 
Crime Severity 
Crime M (SD) 
Alcohol to minors 5.12 (2.26) 
Counterfeit money 6.02 (2.02) 
Mugging 6.29 (1.57) 
Protester pushes officer 3.86 (2.10) 
Note:  Scale ranges from 1 to 9. 
 
 
